MINING SECURE BEHAVIOR OF HARDWARE DESIGNS

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ABSTRACT

Calvin Deutschbein: Mining Secure Behavior of Hardware Designs
(Under the direction of Cynthia Sturton)

Hardware presents an enticing target for attackers attempting to gain access to a secured computer system. Software-only exploits of hardware vulnerabilities may bypass software level security features. Hardware must be made secure. However, to understand whether a hardware design is secure, security specifications must be generated to define security on that design. Micro-architectural design elements, undocumented or under-documented features, debug interfaces, and information-flow side channels all may introduce new vulnerabilities. The secure behavior of each must be specified in order ensure the design meets its security requirements and contains no vulnerabilities. However, manual efforts can be overwhelmed by design complexity, and many hardware vulnerabilities, such as Memory Sinkhole, SYSRET privilege escalation, and most recently Spectre/Meltdown, persisted in product lines for decades despite extensive testing. An automated solution is needed to specify secure designs. Specification mining offers a solution by automating security specification for hardware. Specification miners use a form of machine learning to specify behaviors of a system by studying a system in execution. However, specification mining was first developed for use with software. Complex hardware designs offer unique challenges for this technique. Further, specification miners traditionally capture functional specifications without a notion of security, and may not use the specification logics necessary to describe some security requirements.

This work demonstrates specification mining for hardware security. On CISC architectures such as x86, I demonstrate that a miner partitioning the design state space along control signals discovers a specification that includes manually defined properties and, if followed, would secure CPU designs against Memory Sinkhole and SYSRET privilege escalation. For temporal prop-
erties, I demonstrate that a miner using security specific linear temporal logic (LTL) templates for specification detection may find properties that, if followed, would secure designs against historical documented security vulnerabilities and against potential future attacks targeting system initialization. For information–flow hyperproperties, I demonstrate that a miner may use Information Flow Tracking (IFT) to develop output properties containing designer specified information–flow security properties as well as properties that demonstrate a design does not contain certain Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs).
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<td>Access Control Module</td>
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<tr>
<td>CISC</td>
<td>Complex Instruction Set Computer</td>
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<td>CPU</td>
<td>Central Processing Unit</td>
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<td>CWE</td>
<td>Common Weakness Enumeration</td>
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<td>HDL</td>
<td>Hardware Design Language</td>
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<td>IFT</td>
<td>Information Flow Tracking</td>
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<td>ISA</td>
<td>Instruction Set Architecture</td>
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<td>LTL</td>
<td>Linear Temporal Logic</td>
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<td>OS</td>
<td>Operating System</td>
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<tr>
<td>RISC</td>
<td>Reduced Instruction Set Computer</td>
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<td>RTL</td>
<td>Register Transfer Level</td>
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<td>SMM</td>
<td>System Management Mode</td>
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<td>SoC</td>
<td>System on a Chip</td>
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<td>TLM</td>
<td>Transaction Level Model</td>
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<td>VCD</td>
<td>Value Change Dump</td>
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Hardware presents an enticing target for attackers attempting to gain access to a secured computer system. Software-only exploits of hardware vulnerabilities may bypass software level security features. Hardware must be made secure. However, for designers to determine whether hardware is secure, security specifications must be generated for a given design. Micro-architectural design elements, undocumented or under–documented features, debug interfaces, and information–flow side channels all may introduce new vulnerabilities. The secure behavior of each must be specified in order to ensure the design meets its security requirements and contains no vulnerabilities. Yet manual efforts can be overwhelmed by design complexity. An automated solution is needed to specify secure designs. Mining secure behavior for hardware designs offers an automated approach to security specification, an important step toward achieving secure hardware design.

In hardware designs, weaknesses or vulnerabilities may be introduced, usually alongside new design features offering higher performance, that persist within product lines for years or decades. Consider the Memory Sinkhole vulnerability (Domas, 2015). Introduced to x86 designs in the mid-1990’s with the new System Management Mode (SMM), it remained exploitable on x86 architectures until the Sandy Bridge-EP release in 2011. Despite affecting hardware for almost two decades, the vulnerability was first publicly demonstrated only in 2015. The vulnerable hardware was intended to be secure, and tested for security, but was not validated against a security specification that precisely disallowed the Memory Sinkhole’s attack mechanisms. In Chapter 3, I show how mining can automatically generate such a security specification.

Mining can also promote best practice for the development of secure designs. For example, the Common Weaknesses Enumerations (CWEs) database describes high level design goals
for secure systems, often for software. Recently, as part of an industry-wide effort to secure hardware, CWEs describing many forms of secure design for hardware have been added to the database as well. CWEs may be specified over particular types of designs and represent best practices for generally secure design, such as debug and reset implementations. While assessing designs against CWEs relies on manual efforts, including reasoning about what security means for a given design, CWEs may offer an early line of defense against broad spectrums of attacks. Automated application of CWEs to designs could create designs secure against vulnerabilities to potential future attacks by eliminating common weaknesses. In Chapter 5, I show how mining can automatically generate a specification containing CWE–relevant properties for a given design.

Specification mining offers a powerful tool that designers may use as part of broader efforts to prevent future attacks. For the many designs for which there is no existing security specification, security specification mining can generate one. These generated specifications may then be used for validation efforts. Specification miners use a form of machine learning to specify behaviors of a system by studying the execution of said system, and these behaviors may include the secure operations of intentionally secure designs. In this work, I show how specification mining can address challenges of developing security specifications for different designs, ranging from x86 to SoC designs, and for different logics of specifications, including linear temporal logic (LTL) properties and hyperproperties. I design and implement a series of specification miners to create security specifications of hardware, and evaluate generated specifications against manually defined notions of security. Each miner uses unique methods developed for hardware security mining to define specific security goals.

Specification miners consider a design by taking as input traces of execution and producing as output lists of properties of the design. While traces may take different forms, they capture in some way the state of a design at different time points during a run of execution, such as in value change dumps (VCDs), which log every time the value held by a register or wire changes, or as in debug logs, which may log software-visible signals across clock cycles or control flow changes.
Specification miners may produce invariants, logical expressions that must hold over some design elements at all time points within a set of traces. Miners may also consider temporal properties, such as properties specified in Linear Temporal Logic (LTL), which define behavior across different time points. Miners may even consider hyperproperties, which require reasoning across multiple runs of execution of a design and therefore require reasoning about more than a single trace. Increasingly complex logics of specification allow defining security properties preempting correspondingly complex attack patterns. A temporal property may be used to secure a design against timing attacks, or a hyperproperty may be used to secure a design against information flow leakage.

Specification mining was pioneered for use on software, and state–of–the–art specification miners are often not intended for use on hardware designs. Early specification miners, such as DIDUCE (Hangal and Lam, 2002), which studied Java programs, or Perracota (Yang et al., 2006), which studied APIs, were specifically based around common errors in programs. Miners developed for hardware designs, which lack abstractions present in software such as types or functions, used different approaches to understand design behavior. Earlier hardware miners, such as IO-DINE (Hangal et al., 2005) and later on, GoldMine (Hertz et al., 2013), extracted only invariants, and often only specific kinds of invariants, such as one–hot encoding. These invariants were valuable for studying designs, but were not intended to capture all security agreements of the underlying hardware. Later hardware miners using more descriptive logics, such as SAM (Li et al., 2010) and A-TEAM (Danese et al., 2017) with temporal logics and Hyperminer (Rawat et al., 2020) with hyperproperties, generate valuable specifications more expressive than earlier tools. However, challenges remained to automatically generate properties such as temporal expressions over equalities between registers or information flows that may occur but only under certain conditions. And as expressiveness improves, mining hardware designs may produce far more properties than can be reasonably considered by human designers.

Mining for security introduces further challenges, as specification miners do not innately differentiate security and functional correctness. Especially when considering designs for which
no security specification exists, identifying which properties enact some implicit security agreement may require domain specific or even design specific solutions. Even when specifications cover some cases of insecure behavior identified on a given design, it is another matter entirely to compose these disparate examples into a notion of design-level security, much less a method for understanding secure design generally. Specification mining for security must engage with the question of what is, and is not, a security property.

Secure hardware behavior offers an ever-moving target for security researchers and hardware designers. This work must contend with what it means for a property to be a security property, or a specification to be a security specification. In the case of known attacks, such as Memory Sinkhole (Domas, 2015), security properties may be understood to be some specification mining output property that, if followed, would mean the attack could not be used against the design. Yet secure behavior with respect to known attacks does not necessarily mean a design is secure against all possible attacks. Vulnerabilities may only be classified as vulnerabilities after some attack is discovered, and many designs do not have complete functional specifications that are validated for correctness or complete enumerations of their security requirements in order to anticipate what forms an attack may take. Consequently, generated security specifications can, and in many cases should, contain properties for which there is no known attack or exploit. Further, secure behavior for hardware designs must also consider expectations of software, including operating systems, that run on the design. Hardware features, such as memory protections or privilege levels, may be implemented to service software-level requirements. When automatically generating specifications with the intent to support the security validation process, an automated process may target:

- Software expectations of hardware for security
- Historical examples of exploits
- Existing best practices

Each of these cases are considered in this thesis, often in conjunction.
While scaling to hardware and refining to security both represent challenges, specification mining remains well placed to specify hardware security. In fact, the additional complexities of hardware can in part be addressed by considering security cases specifically, and the comparative complexity itself makes use of automated tools more desirable. The usefulness of specification mining increases further when considering complex notions of security such as temporal properties or hyperproperties. This thesis demonstrates that specification mining can solve vital challenges for secure hardware designs by exploring three cases where security specifications would assist designers in securing hardware.

To demonstrate security specification mining on Complex Instruction Set Computer (CISC) architectures, I created Astarte, a specification miner that partitions the x86 design state space along control signals that govern secure behavior of the processor. Astarte works at the Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) level and may therefore be used for hardware designs that are closed source. By evaluating the output specification against security properties from a manual review of design documentation and additional properties capturing correct design behavior with respect to two historical attacks, Memory Sinkhole (Domas, 2015) and SYSRET privilege escalation (Dunlap, 2012), I show that the Astarte specifications contain properties that are security relevant in each of these cases. Astarte addresses software expectations of hardware for security by considering how operating systems interface with underlying hardware. Some hardware features, such as privilege levels and operating modes, are assumed to provide certain controls, and software may make assumptions of how underlying hardware manages internal state that introduce potential exploits. This was the case for SYSRET privilege escalation, where the SYSRET instruction had different specified behaviors on AMD and Intel designs. When software assumed the AMD behavior applied to Intel designs, the unanticipated hardware behavior allowed user–level attackers to elevate their privilege level. By applying Astarte to traces generated by different operating systems and comparing output properties across them, Astarte may provide insight into the security expectations software may have of hardware. In turn, hardware designers may implement or preempt design behavior related to these expectations to achieve the assumed notions of security.
Astarte is presented in Chapter 3 and is based on joint work with Cynthia Sturton (Deutschbein and Sturton, 2020).

To demonstrate security specification mining of temporal properties, I created Undine, a security specification miner that uses security specific LTL templates to mine security properties. Undine targets Reduced Instruction Set Computer (RISC) central processing unit (CPU) or System on a Chip (SoC) designs. As these designs are open source, Undine works at the Register Transfer Level (RTL). Undine is situated as an extension of the invariant detection methods of SCIFinder (Zhang et al., 2017) to temporal properties, and similarly is oriented toward describing secure design behavior against historical examples of exploits while also producing new properties. The output specification provides properties that, if followed, would prevent known and potential future attacks on hardware that can be defined before, after, and across system state transitions. I show an example exploit of privilege escalation that violates a generated temporal property specifying system behavior prior to reset in Section 4.4.5. Undine uses a labelling system of events to generate LTL properties over propositional variables including equalities between registers and over registers and values for RISC CPUs. Doing so results in output specifications with high coverage and density of historically established security properties. To produce these properties, Undine uses a library of labelled linear temporal logic templates useful across multiple designs, a valuable product of this line of research. Undine is presented in Chapter 4 and is based on joint work with Cynthia Sturton (Deutschbein and Sturton, 2018).

To demonstrate security specification mining of information flow properties, I created Isadora, a security specification miner that uses information flow tracking to mine information flow specifications. Like Undine, Isadora works at the Register Transfer Level (RTL) and is suitable for use on open source hardware designs including RISC CPUs and SoC designs. The output specification gives the information flow relations between all design elements, specifying whether flows may occur between two elements and, if so, specifying the design conditions under which information flow occurs. By evaluating the output specification against designer–provided sets of security properties and against high level Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs), I show that
the Isadora miner finds security properties representing security efforts of individual designers for a specific design and security properties representing established best practices for security. The evaluation considers multiple designs, including an access control module, an SoC design, and a RISC-V CPU. This is presented in Chapter 5 and is based on joint work with Andres Meza, Francesco Restuccia, Ryan Kastner, and Cynthia Sturton (Deutschbein et al., 2021).

The thesis of this work is:

Specification mining can discover properties that can be used to verify the secure behavior of closed source CISC CPU designs, properties that can be used to verify the temporal correctness of CPU designs, and hyperproperties that can be used to verify that modules, SoCs, and CPUs have secure information flow.

The techniques developed and presented in this thesis can enable hardware designers to better specify their designs with respect to security, either fully automatically or alongside existing security efforts, and reduce the barriers to developing more secure hardware.
CHAPTER 2: RELATED WORK

I organize work related to this thesis using three dichotomies:

- Manual versus Automatic
- Software versus Hardware
- Functional Correctness versus Security

2.1 Automatic Software Functional Correctness

Specification mining as a technique was introduced in Ammons et al. (2002) in which execution traces are examined to infer protocol specifications in the form of regular expressions. Weimer and Necula (2005) used both static and dynamic traces to filter out less useful candidate specifications. The Perracotta miner (Yang et al., 2006) tackled the challenges posed by having imperfect execution traces and by the complexity of the search space. DIDUCE (Hangal and Lam, 2002) studied software designs by instrumenting them to extract invariants online rather than offline. The Daikon Dynamic Invariant Detector (Ernst et al., 2007) learns properties that express desired semantics of a program running offline on execution traces.

While described as intended to discover program invariants, Daikon represents an ongoing and multi-decade research effort in dynamic invariant detection, and its underlying inference engine offers a powerful tool for exploration of hardware designs as well. For this reason, in this work Daikon is used within both the Astarte and Isadora framework. Astarte applies Daikon in multiple passes over trace sets to produce properties conditioned on extracted control signals. Isadora applies Daikon to trace slices identified by information flow tracking to define predicates that specify design conditions during information flows.
Specification mining has also been applied to temporal logics. The Javert miner (Gabel and Su, 2008a) finds temporal properties using small generic patterns that are composed soundly into larger specifications, and establishes this form of mining is NP-Complete. Reger et al. (2013) extends mining with patterns to parametric temporal specifications expressed as quantified event automata. The Texada General LTL Specifications Miner (Lemieux et al., 2015) accepts user-defined LTL templates and studies traces to produce instantiations of the LTL formula.

While first demonstrated for use in software engineering, the generality of Texada allows it to be easily extensible. Texada supports arbitrary templates and is helpfully maintained as an open source tool. For this reason, Texada is used within the Undine framework, where Texada’s template enumerator is modified to incorporate a labelling system on trace events.

2.2 Automatic Software Security

In the software domain a number of technologies, including specification mining, have been applied to develop security specifications automatically.

AutoISES (Tan et al., 2008) uses security check rules and static analysis of source code to automatically generate security specifications of operating systems. Juxta (Min et al., 2015) also uses static analysis, in this case applied to the Linux file system and extensible to web browsers, network protocols, and other forms of software with multiple implementations. ClearView (Perkins et al., 2009) is a security autopatcher for Windows that works on binaries rather than source code with a specification mining component that studies normal behavior to devise error detectors. Yamaguchi et al. (2011) datamines API usage patterns which, when provided with a known vulnerability, enable automatic extrapolation of vulnerabilities over libraries.

2.3 Automatic Hardware Functional Correctness

Specification extraction has been applied to hardware, usually run in simulation, with different considerations made to handle hardware complexity.
IODINE (Hangal et al., 2005) applied automatic specification generation to hardware by looking for instances of known patterns, such as one-hot encoded signals and req-ack. Reflecting the origins of the technique in the software domain, IODINE continues the research directions of both DIDUCE (Hangal and Lam, 2002) and Daikon (Ernst et al., 2007) from the software domain, applying optimizations from both online and offline software mining to generate results over hardware in an offline context.

Rather than rely on patterns, Chang and Wang (2010) use sequential data mining of simulation traces for automatic exploit detection specifically around potentially malicious inputs. Liu and Vasudevan (2013) perform mining at a higher abstraction level by studying Transaction Level Model (TLM) simulated traces.

El Mandouh and Wassal (2012) also use hardware specific patterns, but use static analysis to generate them before moving to a dynamic stage. GoldMine (Hertz et al., 2013) mines traces for specific patterns, and also includes manual efforts in a stage where designers rank assertions.

More recent work has focused on mining temporal properties from execution traces. Similar to techniques in software with temporal specification, Li et al. (2010) use predefined patterns and pattern chaining to mine temporal properties from traces. Liu et al. (2012) mine over traces specified at word level rather than bit level, and shows that experimentally this results in higher expressiveness, including on RISC CPU designs. Behavioral models (Danese et al., 2015) and power state machines of SoC designs (Danese et al., 2016) both may also provide useful abstractions to study hardware. The A–TEAM miner (Danese et al., 2017) is able to mine designs given LTL templates.

Most recently, Rawat et al. (2020) developed algorithms to mine hyperproperties expressed in HyperLTL using trace fuzzing. Their framework, Hyperminer, finds useful hyperproperties, including noninterference, an information flow property, over a small SoC design. In this respect, Hyperminer is similar to Isadora which produces information flow properties of small SoCs and other designs. By way of contrast, Isadora additionally describes flow conditions, or conditional
interference patterns, which capture common security goals where design elements must interact but only with certain privileges, permissions, or under some other design condition.

### 2.4 Manual Hardware Security

The first security properties developed for hardware designs were manually crafted. Security Checkers (Bilzor et al., 2011) uses manually defined hardware design language (HDL) assertions to generate hardware runtime monitors. SPECS (Hicks et al., 2015) also uses manual assertions but works on only security critical state at the ISA level to reduce overhead and run on a full RISC processor. Brown (2017) reviewed the Intel Software Developers Manuals (Intel, 2020) to manually define security critical properties at ISA level for x86. Recent case studies (Dessouky et al., 2019) have revealed the types of properties needed to find exploitable bugs in the design of a RISC-based system-on-chip.

### 2.5 Automatic Hardware Security

SCIFinder (Zhang et al., 2017) semi-automatically generates security critical properties by using machine learning to label generated invariants based on similarity to known bugs. Transys (Zhang and Sturton, 2020) is able to automatically generate security properties for a target design by translating known properties from some other design to analogous properties on the original design, but does require some initial set of known security properties.

### 2.6 Contextualizing this Thesis

This thesis considers security specification mining with intent to support security validation of hardware designs. To do so, each miner takes lessons from across each dichotomy, and adapts them to work specifically on hardware security. For example, the Undine miner, which creates linear temporal logic (LTL) specifications, uses the Texada LTL Specifications Miner, and the Astarte miner, which discovers invariants using control signals, and the Isadora miner, which
generates predicates that condition information flows, use the Daikon Dynamic Invariant Detector. However, Texada and Daikon are tools for automating software functional correctness. To use these tools for hardware security requires synthesizing insights from both applying specification mining to hardware, such as the patterns seen in IODINE and other miners, and from distinguishing security properties from functional properties, such as in SPECS and SCIFinder. In isolation, IODINE, A-TEAM, and other miners do not target security specifications, and SPECS and SCIFinder do not automatically generate information flow or LTL specifications or specifications for CISC designs. To automatically generate security specifications of hardware designs that cover known and potential future attacks, the work presented in thesis develops hardware security specification mining over different designs and logics of specification.

2.6.1 Astarte

In the case of Astarte, which targets the Instruction Set Architecture level, existing tools including the Daikon Dynamic Invariant Detector readily produce trace invariants given some form of trace data. However, Daikon does not innately generate properties of the form \( A \implies B \). Daikon allows users to specify possible predicates for the antecedent \( A \), and will then generate implication properties which specify some consequent \( B \). Many manual efforts to describe secure behavior of processor designs frequently contain implications (Bilzor et al., 2011; Hicks et al., 2015; Brown, 2017; Bilzor et al., 2012). One approach may be to specify every possible predicate \( A \), but this approach is exceedingly costly over x86, the studied design, which contains too many possible antecedents to consider exhaustively. Further, this approach would produce many properties with no notion of their relevance to preventing future attacks.

The Astarte framework approaches the challenge of dynamic invariant detection over x86 using the notion of security critical control signals. Astarte iteratively performs invariant detection to restrict the space of candidate predicates and then uses these predicates to discover a property set expressive enough to contain manually developed security properties, including implications, yet excluding many redundant or uninteresting properties.
2.6.2 Undine

Undine approaches the challenge of generating LTL properties over up to three propositional variables to include register, subfield, bit, and delta values and equality between registers over gigabyte trace sets. Existing hardware miners could address subsets of these events or templates of up to two variables, and Texada could mine properties of this form generally but faced challenges with regard to complexity. Additionally, Undine targets output specifications that specifically prevent attacks. When approaching the trace sets needed to converge on a steady state of properties for open source RISC designs, Texada struggled to produce properties in under four hours due to the number of unique variables in RISC traces, which were approximately three times greater than the maximum of 1000 unique variables used to evaluate Texada by Lemieux et al. (2015). This is explored in depth in Section 4.4.3, where the Undine workflow is evaluated with unmodified and partially modified Texada instances to contextualize Undine with prior art on different templates.

Undine can also be considered in the context of temporal hardware miners. SAM (Li et al., 2010) extracts expressive properties using many scalability optimizations, including submodule and subtrace decomposition. SAM uses delta event traces which only capture register values, and extension to consider equality between registers would be nontrivial. A–TEAM extracts properties of the form $G(\theta \Rightarrow \psi)$ by combining coverage analysis with data mining. By contrast, Undine is able to consider templates over three variables yet innately contains no coverage analysis. With respect to coverage for Undine, trace volume needed to converge to a steady set of properties was studied and is discussed in Section 4.4.6.

2.6.3 Isadora

In the case of Isadora, existing specification miners with the exception of Hyperminer were unable to produce information flow properties. Hyperminer produces noninterference properties over pairs of design elements using template enumeration (the technique used in Undine). An Isadora information flow specification contains two parts. The first part is the “Never-Flow Pairs”
of Section 5.3.2 which are equivalently expressive to properties produced by Hyperminer using the noninterference template. The second part is the “Flow Conditions” which are equivalently expressive to declassification, a form of information flow property distinct from noninterference (and dynamic determinism, the other demonstrated Hyperminer template).

It is likely the case that Hyperminer template enumeration could be extended through further efforts to target declassification properties. This would be logically similar to property development in Isadora, which at a high level used IFT to determine interference patterns and from there composed declassification properties. This process and more comparisons to Hyperminer are discussed in Chapter 5.
CHAPTER 3: ASTARTE: MINING CISC ARCHITECTURES

3.1 Introduction

Many existing property specification tools were developed for, and are applicable to, open-source programs with respect to functional correctness. Even when applied to hardware, tools often only work with open source designs, such as OR1200 or RISC-V. Considering the x86 instruction set architecture (ISA) introduces three main challenges. First, the size of the ISA makes even a semi-manual approach prohibitive; Second, x86 is closed-source and existing approaches to mining security specifications relied on access to both the source code and the developers’ repositories, bugtracker databases, and email forums (Deutschbein and Sturton, 2018); Third, compared to today’s RISC architectures, x86 offers a richer landscape of security features and privilege modes, increasing the number and complexity of the associated security properties.

To overcome these challenges, I developed Astarte, a fully automatic security specification miner for x86. On x86, the key challenge with mining security critical properties is automatically identifying those properties that are relevant for security, that if violated would leave the processor vulnerable to attack. In general, there is no fixed line separating functional properties from security properties. The environment in which a processor operates and the attacker’s motivation and capabilities may move some properties across the security-critical boundary in either direction.

Prior work tackled this problem by analyzing existing design bugs and manually sorting them as exploitable or not exploitable (Zhang et al., 2017). However, this approach is labor intensive and does not easily scale to x86. Further, this approach requires knowledge of and access to the details of known design bugs culled from developers’ archives, code repositories, and bugtracker databases, which are not available for the closed-source x86 designs.
Astarte uses a different approach. By mining properties that are conditioned on the state of the various control signals that govern security-critical behavior of the processor, Astarte need not rely on inaccessible documentation. The corresponding properties are by definition important for the correct and secure behavior of the processor, which in turn is important for the correct implementation of the security primitives that operating systems (OSs) and software rely on. In this respect, Astarte is inspired by prior, manual efforts (Bilzor et al., 2011; Hicks et al., 2015; Brown, 2017; Bilzor et al., 2012).

Astarte handles the complexity of the x86 ISA by independently considering the space of properties for each instruction preconditioned on the value of a single security-relevant control signal. In other words, the mining partitions the specification generation problem with respect to each control signal. It is perhaps counter-intuitive that this approach works; it would seem necessary to consider all possible combinations of all security-relevant signals for every instruction in order to produce meaningful security properties. Yet, compared to prior manual efforts and to known bugs in shipped x86 products, the specification output of Astarte independently produces valuable properties using this technique.

The Astarte framework relies on two existing tools, the QEMU emulator (Bellard, 2005), which creates traces over x86, and the Daikon Dynamic Invariant Detector (Ernst et al., 2007), a popular tool for mining specifications of programs. Using the QEMU debug interface, I generated ISA level traces of x86 running four distinct operating systems and bare metal programs. Astarte incorporates a custom front end for Daikon to interpret the QEMU debug logs as trace data and mine invariants over these emulated runs. Daikon, a major research and software engineering effort extending for decades, offers modular interfaces for this custom front end and a powerful internal inference engine. Together these provide a strong foundation for scalability to studying the x86 architecture.

When run on emulated traces, Astarte produces roughly 1300 properties. I evaluated these properties against 29 security properties manually discovered by Brown (2017). Of the 29 identified security properties, Astarte generates 23, and the remaining 6 require invariants over pro-
cessor state unimplemented in QEMU. Astarte also generates properties that, if followed, would
prevent two bugs in x86 documented in public domain, Memory Sinkhole (Domas, 2015) and
SYSRET privilege escalation (Dunlap, 2012).

By performing trace generation over multiple operating systems and bare metal execution, I
show Astarte can also differentiate properties enforced by the processor from those that must be
enforced by the operating system. This analysis also provides insight into properties that are not
specified, but that operating systems have come to rely on.

This chapter presents a security specification miner for closed-source, x86 architectures and
its evaluation for the Intel x86 (Ivy Bridge) processor. Astarte demonstrates:

• partitioning specification ming using security-relevant control signals;

• automatically identifying the control signals of interest;

• differentiating processor-level properties and operating system-level properties; and

• identifying de facto security-critical properties upon which operating systems rely.

3.2 Properties

The Astarte framework generates properties written over instruction set architecture (ISA)
level expressions conditioned on current instructions and automatically discovered control sig-
nals. This section discusses the structure of these properties and describes which properties are
considered to be security properties for this framework.

3.2.1 Example Properties

Astarte properties describe the constraints and behavior of ISA level state. The grammar is
described in Figure 3.1, where \( \text{insn} \) represents the predicate for some specific instruction and
\( \text{sig} \) represents the valuation of a signal. Signals here can represent software visible registers
or individual bits within some specific registers. The process of determining individual bits for consideration is detailed in Section 3.3.2.2.

Each property produced by Astarte describes the processor state as an implication. The antecedent may be a predicate specifying that the property describes processor state during the execution of a particular instruction, specifying that some expression over signals holds, or specifying both. For brevity, these antecedent predicates will be referred to as preconditions. The consequent specifies an expression over signals. Expressions over signals, in either antecedents or consequents, may be:

- equalities between the values of two signals,
- equalities between the value of a signal and a constant,
- a signal’s value falling within a set of up to three constants, or
- equality between the current value of a signal and the previous value of the same signal, which is specified using \( orig() \).

For example, the property in Figure 3.2a states that when the instruction executes, the I/O privilege level (IOPL, as given by bit 13 of the EFLAGS register) must be greater than or equal to the current privilege level (CPL, as given by bit 13 of the Code Segment Pointer). In this case, this is a property found in the context of a single instruction.

A property may refer to the value held by a bit or register both before and after the relevant instruction executes by using an \( orig() \) expression to describe the original value before execution. For example, the property in Figure 3.2b refers to the state of the Code Segment Pointer (CS).
before and after execution of the \texttt{jmp.far} instruction. It states that if a new CS is loaded by a far jump, then the privilege levels of the other current segment pointers, the Stack Segment Pointer (SS) and Data Segment Pointer (DS), must be equal. Here DPL denotes ‘descriptor privilege level’ and is the privilege of a given segment pointer; the CPL is simply the DPL for the CS. In this case, this is a property found using a precondition that the CS value after instruction executes must differ from the CS prior to execution. Of note, while near and far jumps are not differentiated by name in emulation, the Astarte trace encoding stage inspects opcodes to differentiate near and far cases, and appends the \texttt{.far} suffix at this time.

\begin{tabular}{|l|}
\hline
\texttt{in} \rightarrow \texttt{EFL[13]} \geq \texttt{CS[13]} \\
(a) After the \texttt{in} instruction executes IOPL must be greater than CPL \\
\texttt{(jmp.far} \land \texttt{CS} \neq \texttt{orig(CS))} \rightarrow \texttt{DS.DPL = SS.DPL = CPL} \\
(b) If a far jump loads a new code segment pointer, privilege levels of segment pointer must be equal. \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

Figure 3.2: Example properties

Given the constraints of generating traces over a closed source design, the example properties here describe values as reported through emulation debug interfaces. Astarte assumes the correctness of emulation. Prior work, such as Fast PokeEMU (Yan and McCamant, 2018), addresses directly the correctness of CPU emulation.

### 3.2.2 Control Signals for Preconditions

Key to the working definition of security property for Astarte is the notion of a control signal. Within Astarte, control signals are registers or bits which, when included in the trace generation stage within preconditions, produce output properties distinct from the set of output properties discovered when not using preconditions. The precise preconditions are described in detail in Section 3.3.2.1.

Should some signal, when used as a precondition for extracting properties, produce a distinct property set, the signal is then associated with some distinct behavior of the processor, such as that the signal’s value may only be changed under certain conditions, that certain instructions
may operate in a particular way while the signal is set, or that, when set, values of other design elements may or may not be updated. In brief, these signals control the allowable behavior of a design.

3.2.3 Security Properties for Astarte

Astarte is intended to discover properties that describe the intended secure behavior of processor designs. Astarte should capture some notion of software’s expectations of hardware, such as by enforcing control bits exercised by operating systems including the IOPL and CPL. Astarte should also provide coverage of some security properties discovered through manual review of documentation, and discover properties that, if followed, would prevent processors from being vulnerable to documented historical attacks. Ideally, Astarte would not be limited to just these cases and may additionally discover unanticipated properties that may aid hardware designers in ensuring secure behavior of the processor. Using control signals within property preconditions may address each of these goals.

For this reason, within the context of the Astarte framework, the working definition of a security property is a property over the design describing allowable designs states either when a control signal is fixed or when a control signal value is updated. Some of the limitations of this working definition are explored in the context of the results in Section 3.5.3.

3.2.4 Properties in Implementation

To consider the output properties of Astarte, Figures 3.3 and 3.4 shows the invariant with the precondition of a far jumps that loads a new code segment pointer. This is the condition referenced by the example property in Figure 3.2b.

In these figures, the first line gives the preconditions, and each successive line (which may be wrapped) contains tuples of values or signals which are found to be equal within the trace set when this condition holds. The most frequent cases are comparisons to zero or one, which are broken out specifically in Figure 3.3. The size of this output is greatly inflated by considering
".jmp_far():::EXIT;condition="not(CS==orig(CS))"

['1', 'A20', 'CR0_0', 'CR0_1', 'CR0_18', 'CR0_3', 'CR0_5',
'CR4_6', 'CR4_9', 'D_CPL', 'D_CR0_0', 'D_CR0_1', 'D_CR0_18',
'D_CR0_2', 'D_CR0_20', 'D_CR0_3', 'D_CR0_5', 'D_CR0_7',
'D_EFL_1', 'D_EFL_11', 'D_EFL_13', 'D_EFL_2', 'D_EFL_4',
'D_EFL_6', 'D_EFL_8', 'D_EFL_9', 'D_SMM', 'EFL_1', 'EFL_9',
'orig(A20)', 'orig(CR0_0)', 'orig(CR0_1)', 'orig(CR0_18)',
'orig(CR0_3)', 'orig(CR0_5)', 'orig(CR0_6)', 'orig(CR0_9)',
'orig(D_CR0_0)', 'orig(D_CR0_1)', 'orig(D_CR0_18)',
'orig(D_CR0_2)', 'orig(D_CR0_20)', 'orig(D_CR0_3)',
'orig(D_CR0_5)', 'orig(D_CR0_7)', 'orig(D_CR4_11)',
'orig(D_CR4_12)', 'orig(D_CR4_6)', 'orig(D_CR4_8)',
'orig(D_CR4_9)', 'orig(D_EFL_1)', 'orig(D_EFL_11)',
'orig(D_EFL_13)', 'orig(D_EFL_2)', 'orig(D_EFL_4)',
'orig(D_EFL_6)', 'orig(D_EFL_8)', 'orig(D_EFL_9)',
'orig(D_SMM)', 'orig(EFL_1)', 'orig(EFL_9)']

['0', 'CR0_2', 'CR0_20', 'CR0_7', 'CR4_11', 'CR4_12', 'CR4_8',
'DR1', 'EFER', 'EFL_11', 'EFL_13', 'EFL_4',
'EFL_8', 'FS_DPL', 'GS_DPL', 'HLT', 'II', 'LDT_DPL', 'SMM',
'orig(CR0_2)', 'orig(CR0_20)', 'orig(CR0_7)', 'orig(CR4_11)',
'orig(CR4_12)', 'orig(CR4_8)', 'orig(EFL_1)', 'orig(EFL_11)',
'orig(EFL_13)', 'orig(EFL_4)', 'orig(EFL_8)', 'orig(GS_DPL)', 'orig(HLT)',
'orig(II)', 'orig(LDT_DPL)', 'orig(SMM)'

Figure 3.3: All signals equal to zero or one during far jumps across code segments.

individual bit values and their delta values (with the ‘D_’ prefix) within many registers and considering each of these both before and after the instruction executes. Delta values are not noted in the grammar and are not necessary to the Isadora workflow, but deriving these values offered niceties in implementation, and they are included here for completeness. The delta values for bits are incremented by one so that they do not take on a negative value which is used for error checking within the workflow, so ‘orig(D_CR0_0) == 1’ denotes that the 0th bit of the CR0 register was unchanged from the previous clock cycle before the far jump executes. This bit encodes whether the design is in protected mode, and means the trace set contains no case of a change to protected mode status immediately prior to a far jump that loads a new CS pointer.
Beyond signals found to be equal to zero or one, the example property in Figure 3.2b appears within the output. The second line in Figure 3.4 shows that, over properly encoded traces and under the relevant preconditions, Astarte may detect an equality between the descriptor privilege levels (DPLs) of the code segment, stack segment, and data segment pointers after a far jump executes. Of note, CPL and CS.DPL are both listed because both the emulator and Astarte derive the value independently. QEMU only derives the CPL and Astarte derives the DPL for all segment pointers; the two are always equal because they refer to the same bits in CS.

This output additionally specifies the values or equalities of other registers. The Extra Segment Pointer (ES) is also found to have a descriptor privilege level equal to that of the CS, SS, and DS. DR7, a debug register, is found to always hold the value 1024. DR7 is frequently set to 1024, and it fact is set to 1024 in all cases in operating system traces. CR3, the Page Fault Linear Address for recovery after page faults, is also held constant across code segment changes. CR3 is updated within the trace set but never during a far jump.

Astarte’s output properties can appear large and complex due to the internal implementation details and scope of design state, but they conveniently define processor conditions within a single instruction and precondition and simply describe the software visible state as emulated and logged at these points.
3.3 Methodology

Astarte works in three phases: trace generation, property mining, and post-processing. Figure 3.5 provides an overview of the Astarte workflow. In the first phase I generate traces of execution of the processor. Without access to the source code of the processor design, I can not use a simulator to generate traces of processor execution as in prior work. Instead I use QEMU, an x86 emulator, to emulate processor execution. QEMU translates blocks of code at a time, and as such produces traces of basic blocks. The miner requires traces of individual instructions, so Astarte extends the generated traces so that each event in the trace represents a single instruction. This extension is sound with respect to the generated properties. In keeping with prior art, Astarte tracks processor state that is visible to software; the final security properties are written over this software-visible state. I emulate the processor loading and running four different operating systems as well as running software on the bare (emulated) metal.

In the second phase Astarte mines the traces of execution looking for security properties. I build the miner on top of the Daikon invariant generation tool (Ernst et al., 2007). The closed-source nature of x86 processors precludes using known, exploitable design bugs to differentiate security-critical properties from functional properties as was done by Zhang et al. (2017) when targeting RISC processors. Furthermore, the complexity of the many x86 protection modes and their associated control flags overwhelms the miner. In an initial experiment letting a naive miner run for 7 days, hundreds of millions of invariants were generated, with only a fraction representing useful security properties. To address this, Astarte partitions the state space of the processor on each of a small handful of security-critical control signals, and generates invariants within each partition. It is perhaps counter-intuitive that this approach works; it would seem necessary to consider all possible combinations of all security-relevant signals for every instruction in order to produce meaningful security properties. Yet, compared to prior manual efforts and to some known bugs in shipped x86 products, the specification output of Astarte independently produces valuable properties using this technique.
In the third phase, post-processing, Astarte combines like invariants, integrates results across multiple runs of the miner (e.g., using traces generated from different operating systems), and simplifies expressions. The result is a manageable set of security properties.

### 3.3.1 Trace Generation

To generate traces of execution I use QEMU, a full system, open source machine emulator (Bellard, 2005). Running a processor in emulation allows us visibility into the processor’s state. QEMU-emulated x86 CPUs can boot operating systems, run user-level applications, and output log data about the state of the CPU as software executes. The log data forms the basis of the execution traces over which security properties are mined.

QEMU dynamically translates machine instructions from the target architecture (in this case, x86) to the host architecture. To ease portability QEMU translates first to an intermediate language and then to the host instruction set. To improve performance QEMU translates a block of machine instructions at a time, rather than translating line by line. While this feature may be deactivated, doing so prevented emulation from being able to boot most modern OSs in under a day and greatly increases trace size.

A QEMU translation block (TB) is akin to a basic block (Aho et al., 2006). It is a sequence of instructions with a single entry point—the first instruction in the TB—and a single exit point—the last instruction in the TB. A TB ends at any instruction that modifies the program counter, such as syscall, sysenter, or jmp, or at a page boundary.
The translated TBs can be cached and reused, reducing translation time. However, translating a block of code at a time obscures CPU state at instruction boundaries. In other words, QEMU maintains consistent target CPU state at TB boundaries rather than at instruction boundaries.

From the QEMU execution logs, Astarte may extract events corresponding to the execution of a single TB. An event shows the sequence of instructions that make up the TB and the CPU state after the TB executes:

\[ \langle \text{instruct}_1, \text{instruct}_2, \ldots, \text{instruct}_n \rangle (r_0, r_1, \ldots, r_m) \]

In the above, \((r_0, \ldots, r_m)\) represents the state of the \(m\) ISA-level registers after the TB executes. A trace of events gives the CPU state at every TB boundary. The first event in a QEMU trace is always the single instruction \(\text{ljmpw}\), which jumps to the code entry point. A trace of TBs might look like this:

\[ \langle \text{ljmpw} \rangle (r_0^0, r_1^0, \ldots, r_m^0) \]
\[ \langle \text{instruct}_1, \text{instruct}_2, \ldots, \text{instruct}_n \rangle (r_0^n, r_1^n, \ldots, r_m^n) \]
\[ \ldots \]
\[ \langle \text{instruct}_1, \text{instruct}_2, \ldots, \text{instruct}_j \rangle (r_0^*, r_1^*, \ldots, r_m^*) \]

The CPU state logged at the end of the first TB gives us the CPU state before the second TB executes. Consider this compared to a trace specifying each instruction. The single logged event \(\langle \text{instruct}_1, \text{instruct}_2, \ldots, \text{instruct}_n \rangle (r_0^n, r_1^n, \ldots, r_m^n)\), would correspond to an extended trace of
Producing the extended trace of events would require the emulator translate code line-by-line. But, the emulator still needs to be fast enough to boot operating systems and run application-level code. I take an intermediate approach for trace generation: I use QEMU translation blocks and build a lightweight extension to generate partial per-instruction events. For every TB in a trace, the event generator creates a new sequence of events, one event for each instruction in the TB. Each event lists the instruction executed and partial information about the CPU state. Any software-visible register that can be modified by the instruction is marked as invalid, and all other registers retain their value from the previous event. The generated event corresponding to the last instruction in the TB has the full CPU state as given by the original QEMU event. Continuing with the above extended trace of events, and considering the second event at line (3.2) in the trace, $\forall i, 0 \leq i \leq m$ either $r_{2i} = r_{1i}$ or $r_{2i} = \text{invalid}$.

The event generator errs on the side of soundness: if it is possible for an instruction to change an aspect of CPU state, the generator assumes it does. I used the Intel 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer Manuals (Intel, 2020) as reference when building the event generator.

### 3.3.2 Property Mining

Astarte uses Daikon (Ernst et al., 2007) as the base for property mining. I build a custom front-end that reads in the extended traces of events produced in the first phase, and outputs a trace of observations suitable for Daikon.
Daikon was developed for use with software programs: it looks for invariants over state variables for each point in a program. This front-end treats x86 instructions as program points; Daikon therefore will find invariants over ISA variables for each x86 instruction.

Daikon can handle individual program modules with relatively few program points and few program variables, it is not intended for analysis of entire programs. The amount of ISA state and the number of instructions in x86 is too large for Daikon to handle. The amount of trace data required to achieve coverage of a single instruction, and the size of the state over which to find invariant patterns for a single instruction overwhelm Daikon.

To mitigate the complexity, for each instruction Astarte partitions the space of properties on individual control signals.

### 3.3.2.1 Partitioning on Control Signals

For each instruction, Astarte separately considers the space of invariants over ISA state for that instruction, preconditioned on a single control bit. The key insight is that if Astarte chooses the control bits wisely, the partitioning not only mitigates performance and complexity issues with Daikon, it also produces sets of properties that are critical to security, and can then classify the properties by their precondition. The properties that make up each class provide some insight into the modes and behaviors of the processor governed by the preconditioning control signal.

For each control signal, how Astarte partitions the space of invariants for a single instruction depends on the control signal. For a one-bit signal Astarte creates four partitions, one for each combination of signal values before and after the instruction executes. For example, with the IOPL flag and addl instruction, Table 3.1 shows the four partitions of the space of invariants. Each row of the table represents one of the four possible antecedents of a property. The four antecedents represented in the table completely partition the space. For signals longer than one bit Astarte divides the space of invariants into two partitions for each instruction: \( \text{instruct} \land \text{orig}(\text{reg}) = \text{reg} \) and \( \text{instruct} \land \text{orig}(\text{reg}) \neq \text{reg} \).

27
\[
\begin{align*}
\text{addl} & \wedge \text{orig(10PL)} = 0 \wedge 10PL = 0 \\
\text{addl} & \wedge \text{orig(10PL)} = 0 \wedge 10PL = 1 \\
\text{addl} & \wedge \text{orig(10PL)} = 1 \wedge 10PL = 0 \\
\text{addl} & \wedge \text{orig(10PL)} = 1 \wedge 10PL = 1
\end{align*}
\]

Table 3.1: Astarte partitions shown on the 10PL signal for instruction addl

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Registers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Purpose Registers</td>
<td>EAX, EBX, ECX, EDX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interrupt Pointer</td>
<td>EIP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Registers</td>
<td>EFL, CR0, CR2, CR3, CR4, EFER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Bitflags</td>
<td>II, A20, SMM, HLT, CPL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Segment Pointers</td>
<td>CS, SS, DS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Segments Pointers</td>
<td>ES, FS, GS, LDT, TR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Descriptor Tables</td>
<td>GDT, IDT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debug Registers</td>
<td>DR0, DR1, DR2, DR3, DR6, DR7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command Control</td>
<td>CCS, CCD, CC0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.2: Categorization of QEMU logged registers

The set of properties produced for a particular preconditioning signal tell us something about the behavior governed by that signal. For example, providing \( CPL \neq \text{orig}(CPL) \) as a precondition will mine properties related to how the current privilege level (CPL) of the processor is elevated and lowered.

3.3.2.2 Identifying Control Signals

The first step is to choose which control signals to use as preconditions. I manually organized the x86 ISA state by category and then let Astarte find the meaningful signals within a category. The registers and their categories are given in Table 3.2.

Of these, Astarte focuses on the three control encoding categories: the Control Registers, the Individual Bitflags, and the Current Segment Pointers. These design elements either themselves control or contain fields that control security critical state, such as privilege levels and location of page tables. I chose these categories based on knowledge of the x86 ISA. Initially, Astarte used only the Control Registers and Bitflags, but initial evaluation led me to add the Current
Segments. It is possible other categories may also yield interesting properties. Fortunately, each control signal is analyzed independently of the others, so additional categories of ISA state can be analyzed without incurring a combinational explosion in performance cost. (In Section 3.4.6 I discuss the cost.)

During the signal-finding phase Astarte unpacks registers to consider one- and two-bit fields separately. Mining can be used to reveal many fields that keep a constant value which are discarded as unused fields. To remove these from the considered fields, Astarte collapses all x86 instructions into a single pseudo-instruction and runs the property miner on this modified trace. Any found properties of the form \( \text{reg} = N \) are an indication that for all instructions \( \text{reg} \) has the constant value \( N \) and \( \text{regis} \) is therefore unused. Astarte discards these flags from further consideration. At the end of this phase Astarte is left with 24 signals of interest that either single bits, two-bit fields, or registers.

### 3.3.3 Postprocessing

The Daikon miner produces tens of millions of properties. In post-processing Astarte removes invalid properties, removes redundant properties, and combines similar properties into a format that is easier to read.

#### 3.3.3.1 Intersection Across Trace Sets

Astarte runs the Daikon miner separately for each set of traces representing separate operating system boots and bare-metal execution. In the first step of post-processing, properties from different traces are combined by taking the intersection of all sets with shared elements within a precondition. This ensures that no property that is invalidated by any one trace is considered as an output property. It also generalizes properties to the implementation being studied, rather than to just a single trace.
3.3.3.2 Transitive Closure

Frequently, especially in the case of single bit values, many registers will take on the same value and Daikon will return many equality properties. To make these properties more manageable, Astarte takes the transitive closure of all the equality properties and, instead of lists of pairwise equalities, equality properties are presented as sets of registers that are equal. For example, given the three invariants andb → \( \text{orig}(\text{CPL}) = 3 \), andb → CPL = DS_DPL, and andb → CPL = \( \text{orig}(\text{CPL}) \), the postprocessor would return as a single property andb → \{ \( \text{orig}(\text{CPL}) \), 3, CPL, DS_DPL \} = , where the notation \( \{ \} = \) indicates that any two signals in the set are equal (\( \forall r, s \in \{ \}, r = s \)).

\[
\text{instruct} \land \text{precondition} \rightarrow \\
\{ \langle \text{var} \rangle, \langle \text{var} \rangle, \ldots \} =
\]

In the next stage, properties that share a common precondition are combined to form larger properties that more completely express processor behavior with regard to a control signal. These properties are similar to the previous properties with the sole exception of having multiple sets of equal values, registers, or bits.

\[
\text{instruct} \land \text{precondition} \rightarrow \\
\{ \langle \text{var} \rangle, \langle \text{var} \rangle, \ldots \} = \\
\{ \langle \text{var} \rangle, \langle \text{var} \rangle, \ldots \} = \\
\{ \langle \text{var} \rangle, \langle \text{var} \rangle, \ldots \} = \\
\ldots
\]
3.3.3.3 OS-Specific Values

In some cases, general purpose registers take on a particular value or set of values for an operating system. These values may differ across operating systems, but there is an underlying pattern that is upheld across operating systems and that is critical to security. For example, values must be word aligned or in a canonical form. To identify these properties the post-processor applies a bit mask to equalities between values and general purpose registers to find which bits are held constant in multi-bit registers.

3.3.3.4 Identify Global Properties

As a final step Astarte ensures that all properties are specific to a control signal by comparing against global properties. Recall that Astarte identifies control signals of interest in the first phase. Eleven of the 24 identified signals were found to produce properties specific to those bits. The remaining 13 signals all preconditioned the same global properties. During postprocessing Astarte removes any of these global properties from the sets of properties produced for each of the 11 control signals. These properties are necessarily not specific to a control signal since they have been found to hold globally.

3.4 Evaluation

I evaluate Astarte on its ability to find security properties of the x86 architecture to answer the following research questions:

1. Can Astarte efficiently generate assertions to prevent known CPU security bugs, specifically Memory Sinkhole and SYSRET privilege escalation?

2. How effective is control signal partitioning in achieving effective security properties, specifically versus manually discovered properties?

3. Does Astarte produce a manageable number of properties?
4. How can we expect the Astarte iterative mining technique to improve performance compared to a hypothetical approach of using exhaustive precondition enumeration in Daikon over the same trace set?

The experiments are performed on a machine with an Intel Core i5-6600k (3.5GHz) processor with 8 GB of RAM.

### 3.4.1 Trace Data

To avoid capturing only properties enforced by, or relevant to, a specific operating system I generate trace data while booting multiple operating systems. I boot two Linux distributions (Ubuntu and Debian), Solaris, seL4, and FreeDOS ODIN.

To achieve high instruction coverage I use Fast PokeEMU (Yan and McCamant, 2018), a tool for testing consistency between hardware and the QEMU emulator. Fast PokeEMU repeatedly executes an instruction with varying inputs to achieve high path coverage within an instruction with high probability without relying on manual test generation. I execute these instructions on the “bare metal” QEMU emulator.

Over all traces, Astarte modeled 333 distinct instructions while the Intel specification describes 611. Reviewing the specification I find that of the 278 instructions not modeled by Astarte over the trace set, 275 fall into one of five categories: AES and SHA acceleration, mask register operations, packed value operations, and vector operations (see Table 3.3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mnemonic</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Number of Instructions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>aes</td>
<td>AES acceleration</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k</td>
<td>mask register operations</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p</td>
<td>packed value operations</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sha</td>
<td>SHA acceleration</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v</td>
<td>vector operations</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.3: QEMU unmodelled instructions by mnemonic
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Signal</th>
<th>Flag</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CS[13]</td>
<td>CPL</td>
<td>Current privilege level</td>
<td>Gives current ring while in protected mode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMM</td>
<td>SMM</td>
<td>System Management Mode</td>
<td>If set, processor is in SMM (ring -2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFL[6]</td>
<td>ZF</td>
<td>Zero Flag</td>
<td>Indicates zero result of arithmetic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFL[9]</td>
<td>IF</td>
<td>Interrupt enable flag</td>
<td>Enables hardware interrupts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFL[11]</td>
<td>OF</td>
<td>Overflow Flag</td>
<td>Indicates overflow result of arithmetic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CR0[0]</td>
<td>PE</td>
<td>Protected Mode Enable</td>
<td>If set, processor is in protected mode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CR0[1]</td>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Monitor co-processor</td>
<td>If CR0[0]=CR0[1]=CR0[3]=1 (F)WAIT raises an #NM exception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFL[4]</td>
<td>AF</td>
<td>Adjust Flag</td>
<td>Indicates arithmetic carry or borrow over four least significant bits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS</td>
<td></td>
<td>Code Segment</td>
<td>The currently used program code segment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td></td>
<td>Stack Segment</td>
<td>The currently used program stack segment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DS</td>
<td></td>
<td>Data Segment</td>
<td>The currently used program data segment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.4: Control signals discovered by Astarte

I analyzed 10.2GB of trace data comprising 4.1 million instruction executions. This trace volume is consistent with requirements to find complex conditions in prior art: Amit et al. (2015) found that in fewer than 1k iterations of tests of 4096 instructions—a similar trace volume—most known complex race conditions could be found.

### 3.4.2 Control Signals

Of the 24 control signals identified prior to mining (Section 3.3.2.2), 11 govern a class of properties preconditioned on that signal. The remaining 13, when used as a precondition, produced only properties common to all preconditions; in other words, they do not govern a particular set of behaviors. Table 3.4 shows the 11 control signals along with their common name and a brief description.

### 3.4.3 Achieving Manageable Numbers of Properties through Postprocessing

This section address the research question “Does Astarte produce a manageable number of properties?”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bit/Reg</th>
<th>Flag</th>
<th>Clauses</th>
<th>Properties</th>
<th>Clauses per Property</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CPL</td>
<td>CPL</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMM</td>
<td>SMM</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFL[6]</td>
<td>ZF</td>
<td>1182</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFL[9]</td>
<td>IF</td>
<td>1102</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CR0[0]</td>
<td>PE</td>
<td>1159</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CR0[1]</td>
<td>MP</td>
<td>777</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFL[4]</td>
<td>AF</td>
<td>1402</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS</td>
<td>CS</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td>SS</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DS</td>
<td>DS</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>8571</td>
<td>1393</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Globals</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>4187</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.5: Astarte properties’ implied clauses per control signal.

At the end of the property mining phase (Sec. 5.3.2), Daikon produces 13,722,294 properties across all instructions and preconditions. After taking the intersection of properties across distinct trace sets and taking the transitive closure of properties, Astarte is left with 122,122 properties. Identifying the global properties reduces the total to 1,393 properties, a reduction of close to five orders of magnitude from the naive property total. These properties average 6 implied clauses each per precondition. Each class of properties, defined by a single preconditioning control signal, has 127 properties on average. The distribution of the number of properties and average property size by control signal is shown in Table 3.5.

### 3.4.4 Historical Exploits

This section addresses the research question “Can Astarte efficiently generate assertions to prevent known CPU security bugs, specifically Memory Sinkhole and SYSRET privilege escalation?”

To evaluate the efficacy of the Astarte framework in producing properties relevant for security I consider two case studies, Memory Sinkhole (Domas, 2015) and SYSRET privilege escalation (Dunlap, 2012). Both of these cases received considerable attention from the security and
research communities and, thanks to these efforts to reverse engineer the bugs, I have information about the technical details of the bugs beyond the high-level information provided by Intel’s errata documents. For each case study I examine whether the properties generated by Astarte define secure behavior with respect to these exploits. Table 3.6 presents the results.

### 3.4.4.1 Memory Sinkhole

At Black Hat 2015, Domas (2015) disclosed the Memory Sinkhole escalation vulnerability in SMM. The vulnerability allows an OS-level attacker to enter System Management Mode and execute arbitrary code. The attack relies on using the call instruction with a particular parameter while in SMM. The security properties discovered by Astarte would disallow this exploit. The generated properties prohibit the execution of the call instruction while in SMM, capturing the secure usage of SMM in practice across the studied OSs.

### 3.4.4.2 SYSRET Privilege Escalation

This vulnerability, as described by the Xen Project (Dunlap, 2012) arises from the way in which Intel processors implement error handling in their version of AMD’s SYSRET instruction. If an operating system is written according to AMD’s specification, but run on Intel hardware, an attacker can exploit the vulnerability to write to arbitrary addresses in the operating system’s memory.

The crux of the vulnerability has to do with when the Intel processor checks that, when returning to user mode, the address being loaded into the RIP register from the RCX register is in canonical form. Astarte generates properties that require RCX to always be in canonical form.
when the current privilege level is elevated, which would prevent the vulnerability. It is interesting to note that Astarte only finds this property over traces produced by operating systems, an indication that this desired behavior is not enforced by the hardware and must be enforced by an operating system, as is indeed the case.

3.4.5 Manually Developed Properties

This section address the research question “How effective is control signal partitioning in achieving effective security properties, specifically versus manually discovered properties?”

3.4.5.1 Evaluating Astarte Coverage

Brown (2017) manually studied the Intel 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer Manuals (Intel, 2020) and crafted 29 properties they found to be critical to security. The Astarte properties cover 23 of the 29 manually written properties. The remaining 6 properties required exercising processor state unimplemented in QEMU. These properties are presented in Table 3.7.

In this case, the coverage versus manual efforts suggests Astarte achieves coverage over security properties discovered manually.

3.4.5.2 Effectiveness of Control Signals

Manually developed properties also provide a helpful point of comparison to assess the control signal partitioning methodology.

In Table 3.7, the relevant control signal on which the manually written property is conditioned is listed in column three. Astarte discovered 11 unique control signals, of which 7 were used in this portion of the evaluation. The two most commonly used control signals, the CPL flag also denoted as CS[13] and the entire CS register, were used for 8 properties each. Of note, the CS[13] was explored using the preconditions described in Table 3.1 to capture fixed values and value changes. The full CS register was not compared to fixed values, only value changes. An example property over CS value changes is shown in Figure 3.2b.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Signal</th>
<th>Astarte Property</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>!(JMP/CALL/RET/SYS*) → CS=orig(CS)</td>
<td>CS</td>
<td>29 properties in [298,351]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>IRET &amp; EFL.9=orig(EFL.9) &amp; CPL &gt; EFL.13 → EFL.9=orig(EFL.9)</td>
<td>EFL[9]</td>
<td>1044-1045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>IRET &amp; CPL ≠ 0 → EFL.13=orig(EFL.13)</td>
<td>CS[13]</td>
<td>G72, G206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>SYSEXIT → CPL=0</td>
<td>CS[13]</td>
<td>3, 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>SYS* → CPL ≤ DPL</td>
<td>CS[13]</td>
<td>37, 39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>SYS* → CS_DPL ≤ CPL</td>
<td>CS[13]</td>
<td>37, 39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>JMP/CALL(FAR) &amp; CS≠orig(CS) → DPL = CPL</td>
<td>CS</td>
<td>15, 16, G18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>JMP/CALL(FAR) &amp; CS≠orig(CS) → DPL ≤ CPL</td>
<td>CS</td>
<td>15, 16, G18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>CALL(FAR) &amp; CS≠orig(CS) → CPL ≤ DPL</td>
<td>CS</td>
<td>15, 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>JMP(FAR) &amp; CS≠orig(CS) → DPL ≤ CPL</td>
<td>CS</td>
<td>G18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>JMP/CALL(FAR) &amp; CS≠orig(CS) → CS_DPL ≤ orig(CPL)</td>
<td>CS</td>
<td>15, 16, G18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>RET &amp; CS≠orig(CS) → CS_DPL ≥ CPL</td>
<td>CS</td>
<td>G35, G72, G90, G120, G206, G224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>SS≠orig(SS) → SS_DPL=CPL</td>
<td>SS</td>
<td>G245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>DS≠orig(DS) → DS_DPL≥CPL</td>
<td>DS</td>
<td>G245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>CS.11=1 → CS.12=0</td>
<td>CS</td>
<td>G245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>SS.9=1 &amp; SS.12=SS.11=0</td>
<td>SS</td>
<td>G245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>DS.9=DS.11=DS.12=1</td>
<td>DS</td>
<td>G245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>SYSENTER/SYSEXIT &amp; CR0.0=1→</td>
<td>CS[13]</td>
<td>37, 39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>CS=val,EIP=val,SS=val,SP=val</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Properties over unimplemented</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>MSR or VMX instructions</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.7: Astarte performance versus manually specified properties.
Of all these properties, only those numbered 19 and 20 do not include an implication and therefore could have been discovered without specifying a Daikon precondition.

3.4.5.3 Implications of Postprocessing

In Table 3.7, Astarte Properties listed with a ‘G’ prefix denote those that are found in Daikon output under a heading that does not specify both an instruction and a precondition. These contain the “Global Properties” addressed in Section 3.3.3.4, are identified as “Globals” in Table 3.5, and are counted separately from the 1393 properties not prefixed with ‘G’.

For example, in the case of properties numbered 19 and 20, these properties were discovered when mining with control signal conditions but not mining within specific instructions. Property number 1 offers a similar case with respect to precondition rather than instruction, where the relevant terms were found specified only within a particular instruction without regard for an additional precondition over control signals.

In each case, with a different postprocessing implication, the relevant terms in the ‘G’ designated properties could be output in more specific properties specifying both instruction and precondition, but to do so would expand the size of each property and may, as in the case of properties numbered 19 and 20, require a property for every instruction in the design, greatly complicating validation efforts. These properties were not initially considered within output, but were added to consideration motivated by indices 19 and 20, and I found they greatly eased the process of comparison to manual properties. Astarte property G245 in particular, the property that combines all instructions to assess invariants across the design preconditioned only on control signals but not on instructions, captures all five properties indexed 16 to 20, and G245 describes three control signals over 333 instructions, setting a lower bound of 333 instruction specific properties to describe the behavior captured by G245 in these cases.
3.4.6 Performance Expectations and Daikon

This section addresses the research question “How can we expect the Astarte iterative mining technique to improve performance compared to a hypothetical approach of using exhaustive precondition enumeration in Daikon over the same trace set”

Generating the trace data took approximately 8 hours, processing the traces to make them suitable for Daikon took 57 minutes, identifying control bits on which to partition the property space took 44 minutes. Mining along all preconditions took approximately 16 hours with each control bit costing roughly 44 minutes. Overall, the Astarte framework completed the property generation in 29 hours running sequentially but could be accelerated considerably by parallelizing trace generation and mining runs.

I completed the full mining process for 24 control signals as preconditions. Excluding unused control signals from consideration provided an estimated speedup of 5.82x. This speedup represents a theoretical comparison to a specification mining approach not using the Astarte process and is comparable to running Daikon using the minimal Astarte features necessary to encode generated traces for property generation. However, this implementation would still include such features as derived descriptor privilege levels and opcode aware instruction differentiation for jump and call instructions. Running Daikon without these features would not produce comparable properties. For example, each of property numbered 10 through 14 specifically applies to far jumps and calls.

This estimate assumes that control bits all take roughly the same amount of time to mine. In practice all mining runs specifying a precondition completed in around 44 minutes, and all mining runs completed within 20 seconds of each other. I believe it reasonable to assume this timing trend would apply to other untested preconditions, especially as a majority of these tests were performed over the 13 preconditions that were not found to be associated with any unique design behavior, the expected case for the unstudied preconditions.
3.4.7 Operating System-Enforced Properties

When mining over traces from different operating systems, some properties are found over all operating systems and some over only a subset of operating systems or only on bare metal traces with no operating system. In Figure 3.6 I show how many operating systems are found to enforce each property. Figure 3.7 shows, for each property enforced by 1, 2, or 3 operating systems, which operating systems enforce these properties.

Properties were predominantly enforced either by a single operating system or by all operating systems. Properties enforced by a single operating system are likely fall into two main possibilities: either the properties are well-founded properties that, when enforced, make the operating system more secure in some way, or that they are false positives and found only within a single operating system for this reason. In manual inspections of properties, I found that many of the properties unique to Linux and seL4 were related to ensuring the safety of the specific implementations of system calls used by the operating system. Unsurprisingly, more properties were enforced on Linux and seL4 which have the highest usage levels and most rigorous theoretical
Figure 3.7: Distribution of partially OS enforced properties by enforcing OS assurances respectively. The remainder of unique properties governed specific instruction usage from specific processor states only exercised by that operating system that may or may not be associated with security.

I interpret properties enforced by all operating systems to be necessary implementation features as changing any one of them would likely cause compatibility issues across many operating systems. This assessment is extensible to properties implemented by all but one operating system, especially as the operating system most frequently missing was seL4. As seL4 by design has provably correct behavior it cannot rely on undocumented or incidental features. Without the burden of provable correctness and security enforcement, other operating systems may make reasonable assumptions of processor behavior. These assumptions may eventually become part of the processor specification if many operating systems come to rely on them, making it difficult for hardware designers to modify the expected, though undocumented, behavior.

The few properties enforced by just two operating systems usually govern behavior of a very specific type of system call that is enforced by precisely two operating systems. A few properties
govern specific instruction usage enforced by precisely two operating systems. Similarly, these may be best practice or false positive properties, but represent a small minority of output.

There were also a few properties found to be enforced on bare metal traces but not operating system traces. I regard these as either false positives or these are vestigial properties that persist in hardware but OSs no longer need to rely upon.

### 3.4.8 Properties in the Specification

To provide a sense for how difficult the properties generated by Astarte would be to find manually, I use a scoring function for properties that considered each bit or register within a property against how many times that bit or register is referenced in the Intel Software Developers Manuals (Intel, 2020) to give a sense of how many pieces of discrete information must be considered to generated a property. Figure 3.9 shows the cumulative distribution function of this specification score for properties.
Properties typically would require reviewing approximately 7000 mentions (median 6874, mean 7088) with a minimum of 413, a maximum of 19669, and about 8.9 million in total. The distribution is nearly uniform with slight clustering at the minimum and slightly longer tails on the maximum. Figure 3.8 shows how many discrete mentions of each bit or register occur in the ISA specification.

### 3.5 Limitations

In this section, I will discuss the threats to validity for properties produced using Astarte, including false positives and false negatives.

With regard to false positives, Daikon’s inference engine infers only properties not violated over the trace set, so using Daikon’s inference engine within Astarte restricts false positives to two cases: false positives arising from trace generation, which can include limitations of emulation, and false positives arising from misclassification, which can occur when functional properties are classified as security properties. Some examples of false positives are shown in
Section 3.5.3, along with a discussion of consequences and potential remedies. Though presented within the evaluation, Section 3.4.7 also discusses possible false positives in the context of properties solely over bare metal traces and over no operating systems, which gives a false positive rate of 37 out of 1393 or approximately 2.7%.

With regard to false negatives, they fall into two cases: known and unknown. There are six known false negatives from the evaluation which result from limitations in the emulator and debug logging. Two false negatives relate to logging while switching into long mode, and four false negatives relate to logging while using VMX. Unknown false negatives could arise from limitations in trace coverage, in logical specificity, or in the abstraction level. Even within ISA level conditions, Astarte may miss any property not expressible in the grammar which specifies preconditions over single control bits, or properties involving individual bit flags of a register that was not decomposed into derived variables.

### 3.5.1 Trace Reliance

As with any specification mining technique, Astarte many only determine invariants that hold over traces. In the case of traces over buggy hardware, discovered invariants may form a specification describing buggy behavior. Traces may not cover all cases that can be reached by a design or even occur during normal design operation.

For example, within the trace set, Astarte only observed usage of System Management Mode while running traces using the seL4 operating system. SeL4 offers much higher degrees of security assurances than other operating systems, so the corresponding properties in SMM may restrict what could be allowable behavior to ease the burden of making security assurances.

None of AES, SHA, mask register operations, packed value operations, or vector operations were used at any point in the trace set. Consequently, Astarte does not define secure behavior with respect to any of these instructions, and this lack of specificity is a threat to the validity of the output specification.
3.5.2 Emulation Reliance

Astarte relies on traces produced in emulation and logged through debug ports. Further, traces are produced in translation blocks rather than on a per-instruction level, while properties target instructions. While QEMU does support single instruction translation blocks, doing so incurs memory and I/O costs so prohibitive as to preclude trace generation covering interesting design behavior, such as completing a Linux boot, which crashes early due to memory requirements when attempting to log each instruction.

Further, emulation may not precisely capture hardware implementation. Astarte assumes the correctness of emulation. Prior work, such as Fast PokeEMU (Yan and McCamant, 2018), addresses directly the correctness of CPU emulation.

QEMU is capable of emulating VMX instructions but due to implementation details regarding nested virtualization is not able to log during VMX emulation. Consequently, there are no VMX instructions in the trace set, a limitation relevant to false negatives. Within the set of manually discovered properties, four describe VMX.

Beyond VMX, the QEMU implementation in use in this chapter contains a known error regarding switching into long mode while debugging, which was used for trace generation. Further, long mode is implemented in the model specific EFER control register, and similarly to VMX, processor extensions and model specific registers are not fully supported by QEMU. Ultimately I was unable to log traces while in long mode. While potentially related to trace limitations or human error, this coverage gap occurs around known limitations for the emulator.

3.5.3 Functional Properties

Astarte discovers a number of properties that could reasonably be considered more closely related to functional correctness than secure behavior.

Of the 11 control signals discovered by Astarte, three strictly implement arithmetic operations:
• EFL[04]: AF, the Adjust Flag

• EFL[06]: ZF, the Zero Flag

• EFL[11]: OF, the Overflow Flag

While each of these do affect conditional operation of the processor, they do so largely on the basis of jump/call conditions. Ultimately, each describes arithmetic operations upon which the processor relies to implement secure control flow, but this is not their main purpose within the design and they are not necessarily security specific.

Together, properties over these signals represent 575 out of 1393 discovered properties, a false positive rate under this characterization of just over 41%. The AF and ZF together represent the two signals with the most properties. AF in particular has 286 properties, over a hundred more than any other signal except ZF at 244 and more than double the average.

False positives of this nature could greatly increase effort required for validation. One path to validation with respect to the Astarte specification is to use formal tools, such as model checkers, which incur high time and memory costs over large designs such as x86, and this false positive rate would almost double these costs.

One possible remedy to reduce the false positive rate with respect to misclassification is to use machine learning to characterize output properties based on known vulnerabilities, as shown by SCIFinder (Zhang et al., 2017). SCIFinder used developers’ repositories, bugtracker databases, and email forums to create a training data set, and none of these while studying a closed source design. However, SCIFinder demonstrates a promising technique to for characterizing security properties of CPUs, and could be used to reduce Astarte’s false positivity rate given adequate training data, which is likely available to hardware designers.

3.5.4 Specification Logic and Abstraction Level

Astarte does not discover any temporal properties or information flow properties. Properties are described at ISA level and do not address any microarchitectural state.
Pipeline properties arise from both the lack of temporal properties and the ISA abstraction, and can describe important security requirements. Hardware validation efforts such as Hicks et al. (2015) and Zhang et al. (2017) define security properties at the register transfer level across pipeline stages.

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter presents Astarte, a framework for mining security critical properties from a closed source, CISC architecture. Astarte produces manageable numbers of properties that capture the behavior of the processor under security-relevant control signals. Astarte addresses issues of complexity and closed-source designs not seen in RISC-based security specification miners. I show that Astarte can automatically generate specifications containing manually discovered security properties and capable of securing designs against historical bugs.
CHAPTER 4: UNDINE: MINING FOR TEMPORAL PROPERTIES

4.1 Introduction

Efforts at automatic security property generation can struggle to move beyond invariants to more powerful logics of specification, such as those able to capture temporal properties. Early specification miners for software and hardware, such as DIDUCE (Hangal and Lam, 2002) and IODINE (Hangal et al., 2005) studied only invariants or subsets of invariants, and early efforts at temporal specifications frequently addressed specific patterns rather than temporal logics generally, like Javert (Gabel and Su, 2008a), or study hardware at higher abstraction levels (Danese et al., 2015, 2016). Prior security efforts at the register transfer level (RTL) also studied invariants, such as SCIFinder (for ‘Security Critical Invariant Finder’), used statistical learning to identify invariants as security critical or not (Zhang et al., 2017). SCIFinder produced only non-temporal properties and relied on human expertise to produce the initial training set of properties. To achieve automatic RTL temporal security specification, an automated approach to capture the security critical patterns within designs and a corresponding library of such patterns must be developed. With such an approach, a new design can be mined to generate a set of security properties with little human intervention.

To address this need with specification mining, I developed Undine, a tool for mining temporal security specifications of processor designs. The specifications take the form of linear temporal logic formulas and capture properties that are critical to the security of the processor.

Undine introduces the notion of event labels and uses these labels to find the patterns that are common to the known security properties discovered manually or composed from invariants over the design. For example, many invariants may hold when restricting the considered system to only be studied after it correctly comes out of reset, and invariants that only hold under these cer-
tain design conditions that may be defined temporally. Using event labels and Undine, I build a library of labelled property templates and develop a specification miner for use with the labelled templates.

Undine uses a modified version of the Texada LTL Specifications Miner (Lemieux et al., 2015). Texada mines properties expressible in linear temporal logic (LTL), a modal logic which can encode formalae about the future of paths. Texada offers functionality that dynamic invariant detection, such as by Daikon (Ernst et al., 2007), does not, but requires LTL templates to be provided to the miner. I modify Texada to accept traces containing event labels and to reason effectively about register slices. I added a preprocessing step to provide the needed labelling information to traces of execution, and to apply filters to reduce the complexity of the search. Given these output properties based on security templates, Undine then uses a postprocessing step to logically compose related properties into a concise set of more expressive properties that are critical to security.

I demonstrate the use of the library of labelled LTL security property templates and the Undine label-aware specification miner by mining security specifications of three open source RISC processors: OR1200, Mor1kx, and RISC-V. Using the library of templates, Undine automatically mines 25 of the 28 known security critical properties on OR1200. Undine additionally finds new security critical properties that require temporal logic to express. I provide an example exploit for one such property over the Mor1kx CPU design.

4.2 Properties

Undine generates properties related to temporal relations between elements of design state. The precise structure of these properties is described in detail alongside the Undine methodology in Section 4.3. In this section, I will briefly describe the reasoning behind understanding these properties as related to security.
4.2.1 Security Properties for Undine

Undine is intended to discover properties that describe the desired secure behavior of open source RISC designs in linear temporal logic (LTL) over gigabyte trace sets at register transfer level (RTL). Undine generates temporal properties as expressions over up to three propositional variables that either specify that the value of a register, a subfield, or a bit is equal to some constant, specify the delta value of a register, or specify an equality between the values of two registers. Within the context of the Undine framework, the working definition of a security temporal property for a design is one of these expressions for which a violation would indicate the presence of a vulnerability that an attacker may exploit to breach a security requirement. In brief, for each security property, there is some corresponding attack.

4.2.2 Evaluating Undine Properties

There may be many security properties of a design, and since not all attacks are known, there will be some security properties for which the corresponding attack is not yet known. Assessing these properties poses a challenge, as for some output property that does not describe behavior preventing a known vulnerability, it could be the case that the property is relevant to some unknown vulnerability or that it is simply a functional property.

Ideally, there would exist complete documentation regarding the security requirements of open source RISC CPU designs. In such a case, Undine’s properties could be evaluated for coverage of known requirements, and the relevance of the overall generated specification to security requirements could be also be evaluated.

In practice, there is no large body of known security temporal requirements for RISC designs. If there were, there would be little need for a tool such as Undine to generate security properties. Nevertheless, it is possible to study properties generated by Undine and determine how a design not upholding a particular property could be vulnerable to some exploit. However, Undine produces many properties, and as a practical matter I could not produce corresponding attacks for all of the generated properties. Given this challenge, I assessed Undine in two main ways.
First, I compared Undine against known, manually specified properties from prior work (Zhang et al., 2017) that could be expressed as Undine LTL expressions. Second, I created and demonstrated an example exploit violating a temporal property discovered by Undine. The exploit, on the Mor1kx design, manipulates status registers prior to reset in such a manner that a user may gain supervisor privileges after an exception is raised. This exploit shows that the violated temporal property enforces a security agreement related to privilege levels, and establishes this property as a security temporal property. The exploit is discussed in greater detail in Section 4.4.5.

4.3 Methodology

Figure 4.1 provides an overview of the Undine workflow. As a preliminary step, the processor design is simulated to generate traces of execution. The traces are then input to Undine, which works in three steps: preprocessing, mining, and postprocessing. During preprocessing Undine converts the traces of execution to traces of labelled events and then applies a filter. During mining Undine takes filtered, labelled event traces and a labelled property template, and produces a set of security critical properties. During postprocessing Undine synthesizes properties to produce a manageable set of properties that can be understood by the user and are critical to the security of the processor.

I will use the following security property as a motivating example while describing this process:

assert property

$$\neg((\text{ex}\_\text{insn} \& 0xFFFF0000) >> 16 == 8192)) \lor (\text{id}\_\text{flushpipe} == 1);$$
In this property, the ampersand character `&` denotes the bitwise “AND” operation. This property was developed manually by Hicks et al. (2015). It states that when a system call instruction is being executed that the instruction pipeline should be flushed at the instruction decode phase. It is critical to security because a system call causes a change in privilege level, and the instruction following a syscall in the pipeline, which will not be part of the system call, should not be executed at the elevated privilege level.

4.3.1 Trace Generation

For Undine, a *trace of execution* is produced by simulating the register transfer level (RTL) specification of the design under consideration. The value of each signal in the RTL model is logged at every clock cycle. More formally, a trace $T$ is an ordered sequence of time-stamped,
Figure 4.2: Commented excerpt of a trace of execution from the OR1200 processor

signal–value pairs:

$$T = [(q, x)_t, (r, y)_t, (s, z)_t, \ldots ,$$

$$(q, x')_{t+1}, (r, y')_{t+1}, (s, z')_{t+1}, \ldots ,$$

$$(q, x'')_{t+2}, (r, y'')_{t+2}, (s, z'')_{t+2}, \ldots ],$$

where $q, r, s$ represent state-holding signals in the design, and $x, y, z$ represent numeric values. Tick-marks indicate the passage of a single clock cycle: if $x$ represents the value of register $q$ at time $t$, $x'$ represents the value of register $q$ at time $t + 1$. I will use this notation throughout the chapter. Where context makes the meaning clear, I will sometimes overload terms and use $q, r, s$ to mean both the register and its value.

Each signal–value pair in the trace is an event. A standard value change dump (VCD) file as produced by many simulators suffices as a trace of execution. An excerpt from the VCD file produced by simulating the OR1200 processor is shown in Figure 4.2.

4.3.2 Event Labels

Central to the design of Undine is the notion of a labelled event. I define five event labels, which apply to events that may occur at any time point within some trace.

- register–register (RR): $(q_1 == q_2)$. Two registers, $q_1$ and $q_2$, have the same value.
- delta–register (DR): $(q' == q + y)$. Register $q$ changes by some value $y$ in the next clock cycle.
- register–value (RV): $(q == y)$. Register $q$ has value $y$.
- slice–value (SV): $(q[i : j] == y)$. A slice of register $q$ has value $y$. 53
• bit–value (BV): \( q[i : i + 1] == y \). The \( i^{\text{th}} \) bit of register \( q \) has value \( y \).

Returning to the example, a slice of the register \( \text{exInsn} \) is compared to a value, in this case using a bit mask. (This comparison checks whether the instruction in the execute phase of the pipeline is a syscall.) This is expressible as an equivalent slice–value event. The \( \text{id_flushpipe} \) clause is an example of a register–value event. The original property can be restated using labelled events.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{assert property} \\
& (\neg((\text{ex insn} \& 0xFFFF0000) >> 16 == 8192)) \quad // \text{SV event} \\
& || (\text{id_flushpipe} == 1); \quad // \text{RV event}
\end{align*}
\]

Event labels inform specification mining in two ways:

1. Registers in the design are associated with a particular label and will only appear in events of the correct label;

2. Property templates are written in terms of labelled events and only property instances with the correct labelling will match a given template.

### 4.3.3 Grammar of LTL Properties

Undine mines for properties by looking for possible instantiations of a given template. It is not limited to a predefined set of property templates, but rather takes the template as an input from the user. A user is free to create their own template or choose a template from the library I developed. Figure 4.3 defines the language of properties expressible in Undine. The temporal operators (G, U, X) have the standard definitions of Globally, Until, neXt. The event labels (RR, DR, RV, SV, BV) are as defined in section 4.3.2.
\[
LTL \doteq G(\phi) \\
\phi \doteq \phi \to \phi \mid \neg \phi \mid \phi \land \phi \mid \phi \lor \phi \\
\mid \phi \land \phi \mid X \phi \mid e \\
e \doteq RR \mid DR \mid RV \mid SV \mid BV
\]

Figure 4.3: The grammar of labelled LTL properties

4.3.4 Preprocessing

The preprocessor takes as input a set of execution traces and produces a filtered set of labelled event traces ready for specification mining. There are two tunable parameters to the preprocessor that determine the trace transformation:

- labelling information for signals in the design, and
- register slice size

In prior work, Zhang et al. (2017) found that there is a subset of registers in the design that are associated with properties critical to security. I dub these the security-critical registers. Undine extends this idea further. On manual inspection of the properties, I noted that a security-critical register will occur within the assertion grammar for security properties in a predictable and consistent manner. For example, the id_flushpipe register from the running example would be labelled as RV event. In the security-critical properties in Zhang et al. (2017) and Hicks et al. (2015) the id_flushpipe register appears only in events of that would be labelled as RV. The first parameter to the preprocessor is the labelling information for the security-critical registers in the design.

Hardware designs often use bit packing, for example, storing 32 individual control bits in a single 32-bit register. Another design tactic is to encode semantic information in a slice of a register, as when the highest-order 16 bits of the 32-bit ex_insn register determine whether the instruction is a system call instruction. Security properties are often concerned with the control and semantic information available at the sub-register level. To enable this, the second parameter to the preprocessor is the register slice size: the preprocessor will break every register into its
4.3.7 Property Mining

After preprocessing, the filtered labelled event traces and the property template are passed to the specification miner.

Undine builds on the Texada LTL Specifications Miner (Lemieux et al., 2015). Texada takes in a trace of events and a property template and produces all property instantiations of the given template that are true of the event trace. I modify Texada to handle labelled events and labelled LTL property templates. With event labels, potential properties that would otherwise match the property template but have a label mismatch can be discarded early. The event labels provide an effective filter at both the preprocessing and the mining stage.
Two additional modifications to Texada include discarding registers with uninitialized values and adding support to recognize and effectively handle sliced registers.

4.3.6 Postprocessing

The postprocessing step combines and simplifies properties to produce a more manageable set of final properties. First, all properties that contain an implication are sorted by antecedent. Properties that have the same antecedent are grouped into a new property in which all the consequents are joined together in a conjunction. Second, properties containing an implication are sorted by consequent and all properties with the same consequent are grouped into a new property in which all the antecedents are joined together in a disjunction. Finally, the properties are simplified using the Z3 SMT solver (De Moura and Bjørner, 2008).

4.3.7 Complexity

As with most specification miners the time complexity of Undine is exponential in the number of unique terms in the property template under consideration (Gabel and Su, 2008b). Undine’s complexity is given by $e^T$, where $e$ is the number of unique events in the set of traces being mined and $T$ is the number of events in the template.

Register slice size affects the run time of Undine in two ways. If the slice size is aligned with semantic and control components of a register the templates required to capture the desired security properties tend to be simpler. If, on the other hand, the slice size is too big or too small the number of unique events in the template ($T$) grows. On the other hand, smaller slices always reduce the number of unique events in a trace ($e$).

4.4 Evaluation

I evaluate Undine and the library of labelled templates on its ability to extract temporal security properties at the register transfer level to answer the following research questions:
1. Can Undine find known properties formulated as LTL expressions?

2. Can Undine find new temporal properties that secure designs against potential exploits?

In comparison to other tools, a helpful point of comparison would be to use Undine trace generation and encoding stages but interface with Texada directly rather than using the Texada variant modified to apply the Undine labelling system during property generation. In this sense, Section 4.4.3 offers a point of comparison for the Undine mining stages compared to Texada.

4.4.1 Property Templates

I developed a library of nine labelled LTL templates that describe the patterns common to security critical properties for open source, RISC, pipelined processors. These are described in Table 4.1. The first eight templates in the library come from studying security critical properties developed, either manually or semi-automatically, by Zhang et al. (2017) and Hicks et al. (2015). The ninth template comes from my own study of the processor design specifications.

The third and fourth columns of Table 4.1 list how many properties each template produced when mining the OR1200 processor (Section 4.4.6 provides details on the evaluated designs and mining configuration). Column five lists how many of the known security critical properties of prior art were found by each template. In total, the library of templates covers 25 of the 28 security critical properties of prior work. The 3 properties not found require a bit shift that is determined dynamically, which is not supported by the Undine grammar.

Template 9 uniquely uses the ‘U’ (until) LTL operator and is necessary for finding properties that ensure the processor is initialized correctly. I discuss this template further in the next Section 4.4.2.

4.4.2 Mining with Temporal Templates

In prior work, properties are often defined for the processor starting at the first clock cycle after reset. These assume that processor state is initialized correctly; if it is not, security may
be compromised without violating any property. Specifying the sequence of events required for secure initialization requires temporal operators or some equivalent formulation, a prospect not addressed in prior work on defining security properties.

Using the ninth template ‘\( \text{RR} \cup \mathbf{G}(\mathbf{BV}) \)’, Undine mines properties on the Mor1kx processor and finds seven groups of registers that must be set as equal to each other until the initialization period has ended (until \( \neg \text{reset} \)). These properties are listed in Table 4.2. The first six properties describe registers that are free to change their values after reset; the last property describes registers that must always be equal and could therefore have been captured with the simpler \( \mathbf{G}(\mathbf{BV}) \) template. In Section 4.4.5 I use the first property listed in Table 4.2 as a case study and examine how a design that violates of the property may contain an exploitable security vulnerability.

### 4.4.3 Labelling and Performance vs. Texada

I examine the performance benefits of introducing labelled events, including a direct comparison with baseline Texada to contextualize Undine within prior art. Table 4.3 compares mining time for each template for each of three versions of Undine: Texada, Security Signal, and Labelled. The Texada implementation uses traces containing events from all registers, allows any

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID</th>
<th>Labelled Template</th>
<th>Mined Properties</th>
<th>Postprocessed Properties</th>
<th>Known Properties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>( \mathbf{G}(\mathbf{RR}_a) )</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>( \mathbf{G}(\mathbf{SV}_a \rightarrow \neg \mathbf{RR}_b) )</td>
<td>46843</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>( \mathbf{G}(\mathbf{SV}_a \rightarrow \mathbf{SV}_b) )</td>
<td>8134</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>( \mathbf{G}(\mathbf{SV}_a</td>
<td>\neg \mathbf{SV}_b) )</td>
<td>5794</td>
<td>431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>( \mathbf{G}((\mathbf{SV}_a \land \mathbf{SV}_b) \rightarrow \mathbf{RR}_c) )</td>
<td>1026262</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>( \mathbf{G}(\mathbf{SV}_a \rightarrow \mathbf{DR}_b) )</td>
<td>13088</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>( \mathbf{G}((\mathbf{SV}_a \land \mathbf{SV}_b) \rightarrow \mathbf{BV}_c) )</td>
<td>204138</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>( \mathbf{G}(\mathbf{SV}_a \rightarrow (\mathbf{SV}_b</td>
<td>\mathbf{RR}_c)) )</td>
<td>525322</td>
<td>648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>( \text{RR} \cup \mathbf{G}(\mathbf{BV}) )</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1: LTL templates over labelled events
### Registers Equal During Initialization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Registers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Status registers and exception status register</td>
<td>spr_esr, spr_sr, spr_sr_o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program counter and exception program counter</td>
<td>ctrl_epcr_o, pc.execute_to_ctrl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decoder and data channels</td>
<td>ctrl_lsu_adr_o, dbus_dat_o, du_dat_o, mfspr_dat_o, pc_decode_to_execute, pc_fetch_to_decode, spr_bus_dat_i, spr_bus_dat_o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decode stage register file address registers</td>
<td>decode_rfa_adr_o, decode_rfb_adr_o, decode_rfd_adr_o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fetch stage register file address registers</td>
<td>fetch_rfa_adr_o, fetch_rfb_adr_o, wb_rfd_adr_o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All pipeline register file data registers</td>
<td>ctrl_rfd_adr_o, execute_rfd_adr_o, fetch_rfd_adr_o, wb_rfd_adr_o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debug ports to databus (globally true)</td>
<td>du_dat_i, snoop_adr_i</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2: Properties mined using initialization template on Mor1kx.

Signal to be associated with an event of any label, and does not include label checking in the miner. This is termed Texada because it is equivalent to using the Undine workflow only for trace generation and encoding and thereafter using an unmodified Texada implementation. In this sense, the Texada implementation represents a helpful comparison to prior work on template driven LTL specification mining, with the caveat that other Undine techniques, such as register slicing 4.4.4, still inform performance and feasibility. The Texada implementation reaches a four hour timeout in all cases, including the minimal template $G(R^R_o)$, which as a point of comparison could be mined using invariant detection, such as through Daikon (Ernst et al., 2007), rather than an LTL miner. Security Signal implementation uses traces with only registers associated with security critical properties, allows any signal to be associated with an event of any label, and does not include label checking in the miner. The Labelled implementation uses traces with only registers associated with security critical properties, uses only events in which signals have the correct label to be security relevant, and includes label checking in the miner. In all except the most trivial cases, mining is prohibitively expensive without any labelling, and in the cases of
Table 4.3: Time in seconds to mine the template library by miner implementation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID</th>
<th>Labelled Template</th>
<th>Texada Miner</th>
<th>Security Signals</th>
<th>Labelled Templates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>$G(\neg RR_a)$</td>
<td>t/o</td>
<td>6.823</td>
<td>0.600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>$G(SV_a \rightarrow \neg RR_b)$</td>
<td>t/o</td>
<td>38.682</td>
<td>1.777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>$G(SV_a \rightarrow SV_b)$</td>
<td>t/o</td>
<td>122.186</td>
<td>7.826</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>$G(SV_a \mid \neg SV_b)$</td>
<td>t/o</td>
<td>71.694</td>
<td>6.856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>$G((SV_a &amp; SV_b) \rightarrow RR_c)$</td>
<td>t/o</td>
<td>t/o</td>
<td>217.988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>$G(SV_a \rightarrow DR_b)$</td>
<td>t/o</td>
<td>122.186</td>
<td>18.445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>$G((SV_a &amp; SV_b) \rightarrow BV_c)$</td>
<td>t/o</td>
<td>t/o</td>
<td>515.168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>$G(SV_a \rightarrow (SV_b \mid RR_c))$</td>
<td>t/o</td>
<td>t/o</td>
<td>1521.896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>$RR U G(BV)$</td>
<td>t/o</td>
<td>27.995</td>
<td>0.987</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

the fifth, seventh, and eighth template, mining also timed out at four hours in the security signals case.

### 4.4.4 Slicing and Performance

The register slice size is a parameter to the preprocessor and is adjustable by the user. Smaller slice sizes lead to fewer possible unique events for a given trace, giving a performance boost to the miner. However, changing the slice size in either direction can affect the number of property instantiations for any given template as well as the rate at which properties can be mined. Figure 4.5 explores this trade-off using example template ‘$BV U G(SV \rightarrow RR)$’ which was selected for evaluation to use multiple LTL operators and event labels.

### 4.4.5 Example Exploit

In the Mor1kx processor, the exception, output, and basic status registers must be equal until initialization completes. The first property in Table 4.2 captures this requirement. The lowest order bit of the basic status register indicates whether the processor is the supervisor bit and a low
user changing this bit would constitute a privilege escalation. After initialization the basic status register holds the current status unless an exception has occurred, in which case the status register is saved to the exception status register. I insert a bug into the control module of the Mor1kx processor that causes this property to be violated by the design. The inserted bug changes the initial value of the exception status register and modifies the exception status register update to update all bits except the lowest order bit, rather than the entire register. The system boots normally and appears identical, other than violating this property, until an exception occurs. As soon as an exception occurs, the correct value of the supervisor mode bit is lost. I exploit this bug to allow an unprivileged user to enter supervisor mode by triggering a trivial exception, so that when control returns to the user, its status register incorrectly grants the user supervisor privileges.

Figure 4.5: Mining rate and quantity of output properties by slice size
4.4.6 Number of Properties

I evaluate Undine on three open source RISC processors: Mor1kx, OR1200, and RISC-V. Using template (5) \[ G((SV & SV) \rightarrow RR) \] I mine each of the three processors until a stable set of properties is reached.

On OR1200 and mor1kx the execution traces were

1. arbitrary assembly code,
2. a Linux boot,
3. the built-in test suites of the designs, and
4. a bare metal hello world C program (for a system call)

On RISC-V, I used the C program and three benchmarks: quicksort, towers, vector-vector-add. Figure 4.6 shows how the set of properties converges to a steady state as the trace length and number of traces increase on the RISC-V processor. The OR1200 and mor1kx processors exhibited similar trends.

The figures show the number of properties produced without postprocessing. Table 4.4 shows how postprocessing reduces the final number of properties produced by Undine.

Runs to steady state finish in under 15 minutes. Table 4.5 shows the time it takes Undine to complete a steady state run for a given architecture, broken out into different stages.

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
\text{Mining} & \text{Consequent} & \text{Antecedent} \\
\hline
\text{OR1200} & 597838 & 234096 & 22 \\
\text{Mor1kx} & 755530 & 135378 & 26 \\
\text{RISCV} & 278960 & 104370 & 8 \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

Table 4.4: Property numbers by postprocessing stage using Template 5.
Table 4.5: Undine stage times in seconds per design.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Preprocessing</th>
<th>Mining</th>
<th>Postprocessing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OR1200</td>
<td>34.24</td>
<td>171.36</td>
<td>7.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mor1kx</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>105.79</td>
<td>14.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RISCV</td>
<td>173.20</td>
<td>842.13</td>
<td>3.26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4.6: Steady state convergence of Undine output by trace data
4.5 Limitations

In this section, I will discuss the threats to validity for properties produced using Undine, including false positives and false negatives.

With regard to false positives, Undine utilizes template enumeration so any output property must hold over the trace set. Therefore, false positives are restricted to two cases: false positives arising from trace generation, and false positives arising from misclassification, which can occur when functional properties are classified as security properties.

With regard to false negatives, they fall into two cases: known and unknown. There are three known false negatives from the evaluation which result from failures across both the mining approach and labelling system to address equality across bit shifts and the introduced complexity with regards to template enumeration. Reaching these properties require a either a complete redesign (probably from template enumeration to the property inference technique used in other miners, such as Daikon and IODINE) or enough processing power to make most of the Undine methodology unnecessary. Unknown false negatives could arise from limitations in trace coverage, in logical specificity, within the template library, or within the labelling system.

4.5.1 Trace Reliance

As with any specification mining technique, Undine may only determine invariants that hold over traces. In the case of traces over buggy hardware, discovered invariants may form a specification describing buggy behavior. Traces may not cover all cases that can be reached by a design or even occur during normal design operation.

For example, within the trace set, there is no Linux boot over RISC-V, and Undine discovers only about a third as many RISC-V properties when using Template 5. This is consistent with the RISC-V being incompletely explored by Undine, especially in comparison to other designs.
4.5.2 Uninteresting Properties

Undine does discover a number of properties prior to postprocessing that appear to not be relevant to any security requirements, especially with regards to redundancy or labels not capturing security relevance.

For example, once again consider RISC-V with regards to Template 5. Texada finds 597838 instantiations of this labelled template over the trace set. While these are composed into only 8 properties during postprocessing, this simply means these properties are unwieldy. However, 26944 of instantiations of this implication property specify a consequent term that is known to hold globally. There were two such terms of the appropriate label that were discovered from evaluating Template 1. These properties therefore are redundant.

Additionally, Template 5, developed over OR1200 to find properties about system calls using slices of instruction registers, overwhelmingly captures information other than whether an instruction is a system call, a limitation of the labelling system in assessing security relevance.

Even on OR1200, the register slices over the instruction register produced on the order of thousands of properties while corresponding to only tens of properties describing system calls. Ultimately, in the case of the register slices, the labelling system was more successful in moving mining into feasible time frames than restricting output to only contain security properties.

Notably, this was not the case for all templates, such as Template 9, where most of the initialization properties were interesting in the sense that the template generated single digit numbers of properties and manually crafting an exploit for one of these properties was a straightforward task.

4.5.3 Library Limitations

While the template library greatly expands the number of propositional terms that may be considered in specification mining, in testing it could only complete mining over templates of up to four terms, precluding many complex properties. Further, any property that does not precisely match a known template would not be discovered without somehow knowing to expand the library. Both of these are sources of false negatives.
4.5.4 Labelling Limitations

Relying on known properties for labelling means any register relevant to some security property that is not known to be security relevant would not be included in generated properties. Undine does generate novel properties, but does not generate properties over novel registers.

Additionally, the labelling system required manual efforts in translating across designs and this manual effort introduced the possibility of human error. Translating across designs is a significant research problem that is addressed directly in other research efforts, particularly Transys (Zhang and Sturton, 2020).

4.5.5 Specification Logic

Undine does not discover information flow properties or properties requiring specification in branching time logics such computation tree logic (CTL).

4.6 Conclusion

In this chapter I present Undine, which automatically mines security critical LTL properties to create RTL specifications of processors. Undine produces manageable numbers of properties which, if violated, leave vulnerabilities over which exploits can be readily demonstrated. Undine runs in minutes, is usable across different architectures and can be easily parameterized as needed. I also propose a labelling system for processor events for security critical LTL properties. Using Undine, I develop and demonstrate the usefulness of a library of templates in this labelling system to secure designs against both new and known attacks.
CHAPTER 5: ISADORA: MINING FOR INFORMATION FLOW

5.1 Introduction

Attacks targeting information flow through hardware designs are rapidly growing in number and severity (Chen et al., 2018; Evtyushkin et al., 2018; Kocher et al., 2019; Lipp et al., 2018). Like Memory Sinkhole (Domas, 2015) and SYSRET privilege escalation attacks (Dunlap, 2012), many information flow attacks existed in product lines for decades despite manual verification efforts and extensive testing. What sets information flow attacks apart is that the security properties they violate cannot necessarily be detected by naive specification mining as the attacks work across multiple runs of a design. While specification mining may be extended, it innately only generates properties for a single run of design. Astarte offers an automated methodology that combines Information Flow Tracking (IFT) with specification mining to create information flow security specifications of hardware designs.

Information Flow Tracking (IFT) is a technique to measure flows of digital information through a hardware design by monitoring how data propagates across elements of the design during execution. Recently, IFT has been demonstrated at the RTL (Ardeshiricham et al., 2017b; Hu et al., 2018) and gate level (Hu et al., 2014; Hu et al., 2016; Becker et al., 2017), and has been used to monitor implicit flows through digital side channels (Ardeshiricham et al., 2017a).

Existing verification engines that incorporate IFT capabilities can be used to confirm whether a particular information flow property stated over RTL elements holds. However, it is up to the designer to specify the full set of desired flow behaviors, which is a difficult and time-consuming task and can easily miss some necessary properties. To find these vulnerabilities and others an analysis of how information flows through a design is needed.
IFT and specification mining, together, can provide automated analysis of a hardware design that identifies flow relations between all design elements, including flow conditions and multi-source and multi-sink cases. The methodology presented in this chapter is partially self correcting with respect to trace coverage and requires no input from the designer beyond the design and a testbench.

To evaluate these technologies together, I developed Isadora, a fully automatic security specification miner for information flow properties. Isadora uses IFT technology from Tortuga Logic’s Radix-S simulation based security verification engine and for specification mining uses the inference engine of the Daikon Dynamic Invariant Detector (Ernst et al., 2007), a popular tool for mining specifications of programs. Daikon, also used for security specification mining in Chapter 3, excels at specifying behavior over traces or trace slices, and was used here to determine predicates over design state during information flows, for which it was well suited.

Isadora demonstrates specification miners are capable of extracting information flow security properties from hardware designs. To understand security of hardware designs, I use high level Common Weaknesses Enumerations from the database maintained by MITRE as a baseline for secure design. The results demonstrate:

• Isadora characterizes the flow relations between all elements of a design.

• Isadora identifies important information flow security properties of a design without guidance from the designer.

• Isadora can be used to find undesirable flows of information in the design.

• Isadora is applicable to SoCs and CPUs.

To measure this methodology and the usefulness of Isadora’s mined specification, I evaluated Isadora over an access control module (ACM), a multi-controller and multi-peripheral system with a known security policy, and a RISC-V design. I evaluated the output of Isadora versus expected information flow policies of the design and find information flow specifications that, if followed, protect designs from known and potential future attack patterns.
5.2 Properties

Isadora generates properties related to how information flows through a design using trace-based analysis and specification mining. However, a single trace of execution cannot demonstrate how information is flowing through the design. For example, consider a design with a user-controlled write-ready signal (\(W\text{READY}\)) and an internal write-ready signal (\(W\text{READY}_{\text{int}}\)). While the system is undergoing a reset cycle (\(\text{ARESETN} = 0\)), the user should not be able to affect the internal state of the module. It is not possible to examine any single trace of execution and determine whether this property is being violated. The individual values of \(W\text{READY}\), \(W\text{READY}_{\text{int}}\), and \(\text{ARESETN}\) do not reveal how the values were calculated nor what information was used in the calculation.

Isadora therefore leverages information flow tracking to yield traces of execution that can be analyzed to determine how information flows through a design, and produce output that specifies secure relations between registers.

5.2.1 Example Information Flow Properties

While trace properties capture many important security policies, some policies, such as noninterference or GMNI, for Goguen and Meseguer noninterference (Goguen and Meseguer, 1982), cannot be expressed as a property of a single trace of execution (Clarkson and Schneider, 2008). Policies over information flow, including those defining security against side channel attacks (Lipp et al., 2018; Kocher et al., 2019; Ho et al., 2018) require expressing a security policy over multiple traces of execution. Whereas trace properties are sets of traces (where a system has a property if its output traces fall within the set of traces making up the property), information flow properties are sets of trace properties, or sets of sets of traces. Information flow properties hold over systems while trace properties hold for each discrete run of a system.

To explore information flow, let’s consider GMNI:

\[
T \in \text{GMNI} := \forall t \in T : \exists t' \in T : t \neq_H t' \land t =_L t'
\]
Where \( t \) and \( t' \) are traces, \( T \) is a set of traces that map to the set of possible traces generated by some design, and relation \( =_L \) represents the notion of traces equal at a low level, or the portions of trace data visible to a low user, and \( =_H \) corresponding refers to the trace as view by a privileged or high user.

Consider the case with a low_user_data signal is visible to a low user and privileged_user_data signal is only visible to the privileged user. To demonstrate GMNI over these signals, show that for any traces \( t \) there exists a trace \( t' \) that differs in the value of \( \text{privileged_user_data} \) but which does not differ in the value of \( \text{low_user_data} \).

\[
\forall t \in T : \exists t' \in T : \text{low_user_data} = \text{low_user_data}' \land \text{privileged_user_data} \neq \text{privileged_user_data}'
\]

In the context of naive trace generation and specification mining, this is impossible to demonstrate because to describe the property requires a comparison between multiple traces. There is no way from the perspective of a specification miner to determine that a single trace that could be generated by the studied system could be added to a trace set to satisfy GMNI. Similarly, a single additional trace could be generated by a design but was not included in some studied trace set. There must be some notion of what possible states may exist for a design.

Of note, Hyperminer (Rawat et al., 2020) used specification mining specifically to find non-interference properties of this type using a fuzzing technique. Doing so, Hyperminer may find many important design features. By way of contrast, Isadora also finds noninterference properties as discussed in Section 5.3.2, but further finds conditions under which interference may occur as in the example with \( \text{WREADY}, \text{WREADY}_{\text{int}}, \) and \( \text{ARESETN} \) and as described in Section 5.3.3. These Isadora properties correspond to the information flow property of declassification as described by Clarkson et al. (2014) wherein information may flow between two design elements but only under defined conditions. In the context of security specifications, 95% of the manually defined security properties used for evaluating Isadora presented in Section 5.5.3 are expressed as conditional flow properties.
5.2.2 Properties with Information Flow Tracking

IFT offers a technique for measuring information flows between different elements of design state. Isadora uses IFT at the register transfer level and measures flow between registers specifically, rather than considering individual bits, with ‘registers’ in this context referring to the Verilog notion of a register. Isadora may additionally be configured to consider Verilog registers and wires, though doing so provided no observable improvements to generated specifications and considerably increased trace generation costs. The Isadora methodology can be applied to individual bits, as the underlying information flow tracking used within Isadora does consider individual bits. However, bit level analysis would result in extraordinarily high trace generation costs even over smaller designs.

IFT may precisely measure all digital information flows in the underlying hardware, including, for example, implicit flows through hardware-specific timing channels. From the perspective of specifications, adding IFT to a design allows the use of a ‘not-flow’ operator (written ‘/==>’) when defining properties of the design. In the case of the noninterference example:

\[
\text{privileged\_user\_data} =/==> \text{low\_user\_data}
\]

To provide this functionality, for each signal \( \text{sig} \) present in a design, the design is instrumented in simulation with a new ‘shadow’ signal \( \text{shadow\_sig} \). When considering information flow, one or many signals may be set as the source from which information flow is tracked. These source signals will have their corresponding shadow signals set to be nonzero during trace generation, whereas all other shadow signals will take on an initial value of zero. The added instrumentation will then track flows of information from the source(s) through the design, toggling the relevant shadow signals from zero to nonzero as information flows to a given signal. In the case of GMNI over \( \text{privileged\_user\_data} \) as a source and \( \text{low\_user\_data} \) as the sink to which there should be no information flow, there is no interference if at a trace point the relevant IFT has tracked no information flowing into the \( \text{shadow\_low\_user\_data} \) signal:

\[
\text{shadow\_privileged\_user\_data} \neq 0 \land \text{shadow\_low\_user\_data} = 0
\]
Assume in this case that no signals other than \texttt{shadow\_privileged\_user\_data} are set as the initial source, as it could be the case that some other signal, perhaps another low user data register, could flow into \texttt{shadow\_low\_user\_data}. This is equivalent to assessing at the first trace point that for all signals $s$ in the set of shadow signals in the design $S$, the starting value for all signals other than \texttt{shadow\_privileged\_user\_data} is zero. In that case, the low value for the tracking signal holds over the entire trace, here given by the Linear Temporal Logic \textquote{global} operator $\mathcal{G}$, that the value of \texttt{shadow\_low\_user\_data} is equal to zero at every trace point.

\[(\mathcal{G}(\texttt{shadow\_privileged\_user\_data} \neq 0) \land \forall s \in S \setminus \{\texttt{shadow\_privileged\_user\_data}\} : s = 0) \implies \mathcal{G}(\texttt{shadow\_low\_user\_data} = 0)\]

In this chapter, Isadora will always consider the case where a single source is specified along a trace. When multiple sources are considered, either multiple traces or multiple instances of instrumentation over a single trace can be used to track distinct information flows from multiple sources.

### 5.2.3 Expressing Conditions on Information Flow

Properties including \textquote{when} keywords can be expressed similarly to the logical expression of GMNI by considering a trace set $T$.

\[
\forall t \in T : \exists t' \in T : (\texttt{WREADY} = \texttt{WREADY}' \implies \texttt{WREADY\_wire} = \texttt{WREADY\_wire}') \implies \texttt{ARESETN} \neq 0
\]

That is, if the value of \texttt{WREADY} can be determined by examining the value of \texttt{WREADY\_wire}, then the system must not be in reset. If reset is nonzero, then \texttt{WREADY} is \textit{declassified} and may flow to \texttt{WREADY\_wire}.

Figure 5.1 shows the equivalent expression of the write readiness property over a single trace using IFT.
• Line 5.1 specifies the starting state of the source signal.

• Line 5.2 specifies the starting state of all signals other than the source signal.

• Line 5.3 specifies the sink signal.

• Line 5.4 specifies the condition on this information flow over signals in the original design, and is the only line not to refer to information flow tracking state.

\[
\begin{align*}
(\mathcal{G}(\text{shadow}_W\text{READY} = 1) \land \forall s \in S \setminus \{\text{shadow}_W\text{READY}\} : s = 0) & \implies (5.1) \\
\mathcal{G}(\text{shadow}_W\text{READY}_\text{wire} \neq 0) & \implies (5.3)
\end{align*}
\]

Figure 5.1: A flow relation as formulated over IFT and original design signals.

5.2.4 Properties and Common Weakness Enumerations

This section is based on the process for creating information flow security properties of hardware designs put forth by Restuccia et al. (2021) for the AKER access control module. An early developmental version of AKER is studied by Isadora throughout this chapter.

AKER implements the ARM Advanced eXtensible Interface (AXI) standard to provide secure intermodule communication for SoC designs. The AXI standard is a commonly used on-chip communication protocol. It employs a flexible, asymmetric, synchronous interface targeting high performance and low latency communications. An AXI architecture defines one or more controller devices accessing one or more peripheral devices. Different processors, accelerators, and other IP cores can be assigned as a controller. This allows them to autonomously and concurrently communicate with shared peripheral resources available on the SoC, e.g., a DRAM memory controller, ROM, and GPIOs. In this case, we will consider the AKER access control module specifically.
Secure access control within SoCs are contested sites for both security engineers and attackers, and the MITRE Common Weakness Enumeration database reports a substantial and growing number of hardware weaknesses related to access control systems. While some of these are weaknesses expressible as trace properties and may be captured by traditional specification mining or other techniques, others are expressable only as information flows. In order to properly define secure information flow, Isadora must be able to provide specifications for hardware designs that capture whether a design contains a given common weakness.

Consider this section’s running example on write readiness over AKER:

\[ \text{WREADY} \neq \Rightarrow \text{WREADY}_\text{wire} \text{ unless (} \text{ARESETN} \neq 0 \}\]

This uses the ‘not-flow’ operator with the addition of the ‘unless’ keyword to specify that the flow in question constitutes a violation of secure behavior only under certain conditions, in this case unless the \text{ARESETN} signal is not equal to zero, which means AKER is not undergoing reset. This property was manually specified as a security property by the designers of AKER. Additionally, this flow relation partially implements secure behavior with respect to CWE 1272, on leaking sensitive information during power state transitions, for the \text{WREADY} signal. In this case, AKER is interfacing with some peripheral, and the \text{WREADY} signal is a peripheral visible register while the \text{WREADY}_\text{wire} is an internal register to AKER. The peripheral should not be able to interface with AKER while AKER is undergoing reset as access controls may not be configured. A flow in this case would constitute the propagation of potentially sensitive information without passing access control checks during a power state transition, the weakness described by CWE 1272.

When assessing CWE 1272 more generally over register transfer level state, Tortuga Logic’s Radix Coverage for Hardware Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) Guide provides lower level descriptions of CWEs alongside the high level descriptions present in the CWE database. For example, CWE 1272 is described using the “unless” keyword:
In consultation with the Coverage Guide, to demonstrate CWE relevance for some property it suffices to find some source, sink, and predicate fall within these generic signal groups. While doing so remains nontrivial, it is a lower burden than to define security generally.

5.2.5 Security Properties for Isadora

Isadora is intended to discover properties that describe the intended information flow of hardware designs.

Within the context of the Isadora framework, the working definition of a security information flow property is an information flow property over a design that corresponds to a high level security requirement described in the Common Weaknesses Enumeration database and the Radix Coverage Guide. The CWE database is far from an exhaustive set of security requirements, but represents the collective efforts of hardware engineering and security research communities. It offers a baseline for weakness identification, mitigation, and prevention efforts. This formulation of security properties, especially with regard to the Radix Coverage Guide, is described in greater detail by Restuccia et al. (2021) specifically for access control.

Some properties produced by Isadora are classified as functional properties under this definition, which is discussed further in Section 5.6.2.

5.2.6 Properties in Implementation

To consider the output properties of Isadora, Figures 5.3 shows an example of Isadora output, Case 154 of the 303 output properties over AKER. Here the predicates shown are register equal-
case 154: 2_121_250_379_543
\[ _\text{src}_ \text{ in } \{ \text{w}_\text{base}_\text{addr}_\text{wire}, \text{M}_\text{AXI}_\text{AWREADY}_\text{wire}, \text{AW}_\text{CH}_\text{DIS}, \text{w}_\text{max}_\text{outs}_\text{wire}, \text{AW}_\text{ILLEGAL}_\text{REQ}, \text{w}_\text{num}_\text{trans}_\text{wire}, \text{AW}_\text{STATE}, \text{AW}_\text{CH}_\text{EN} \} \]
\[ =/=> \]
\[ _\text{snk}_ \text{ in } \{ \text{M}_\text{AXI}_\text{WDATA} \} \]
\[ \text{unless} \]
\[ 0 \neq _\text{inv}_ \text{ in } \{ \text{ADDR}_\text{LSB}, \text{ARESETN}, \text{M}_\text{AXI}_\text{ARBURST}_\text{wire}, \text{M}_\text{AXI}_\text{ARCACHE}_\text{wire}, \text{M}_\text{AXI}_\text{ARLEN}_\text{wire}, \text{M}_\text{AXI}_\text{ARREADY}, \text{M}_\text{AXI}_\text{ARSIZE}_\text{wire}, \text{M}_\text{AXI}_\text{AWBURST}_\text{wire}, \text{M}_\text{AXI}_\text{AWCACHE}_\text{wire}, \text{M}_\text{AXI}_\text{AWLEN}_\text{wire}, \text{M}_\text{AXI}_\text{AWREADY}, \text{M}_\text{AXI}_\text{AWSIZE}_\text{wire}, \text{M}_\text{AXI}_\text{BREADY}, \text{M}_\text{AXI}_\text{BREADY}_\text{wire}, \text{M}_\text{AXI}_\text{WREADY}, \text{M}_\text{AXI}_\text{WREADY}_\text{wire}, \text{M}_\text{AXI}_\text{WSTRB}_\text{wire}, \text{OPT}_\text{MEM}_\text{ADDR}_\text{BITS}, \text{S}_\text{AXI}_\text{CTRL}_\text{BREADY}, \text{S}_\text{AXI}_\text{CTRL}_\text{RREADY}, \text{data}_\text{val}_\text{wire}, \text{r}_\text{burst}_\text{len}_\text{wire}, \text{r}_\text{displ}_\text{wire}, \text{r}_\text{max}_\text{outs}_\text{wire}, \text{r}_\text{num}_\text{trans}_\text{wire}, \text{r}_\text{phase}_\text{wire}, \text{w}_\text{burst}_\text{len}_\text{wire}, \text{w}_\text{displ}_\text{wire}, \text{w}_\text{max}_\text{outs}_\text{wire}, \text{w}_\text{num}_\text{trans}_\text{wire}, \text{w}_\text{phase}_\text{wire} \} \]

Figure 5.3: An example of an Isadora property, Case 154, over AKER.

ity testing versus zero. Other predicates are captured within the workflow but not propagated to
individual properties formatted for output.

A visible difference between an Isadora output property and some given information flow
property, such as the running example, is that Isadora properties may specify multiple source
registers, may consider multiple sink registers though Case 154 does not do so, and may contain
multiple predicates specifying conditions.

Case 154 includes an example of a flow condition between internal and peripheral visible
signals in addition to specifying other aspects of design behavior. This is similar to the example
of write readiness, but in Case 154, the flow is from the internal signal to the peripheral, but the
predicate over the power state is identical. Of note, as in the case of write readiness, this flow
occurs exclusively within the write channel, as denoted by the “W” present in ready wire and the
data register.

\[
\text{AWREADY}_\text{wire} =/=> \text{WDATA} \text{unless} (\text{ARESETN} \neq 0)
\]
Under the working definition of security properties for Isadora, where internal signals and peripheral signals should not flow to one another unless AKER is not undergoing a reset, this description of behavior composed of a single source, single sink, and single predicate establishes Case 154 as a security property under the working definition. Case 154 describes signals marked as sensitive by designers, both labelled as such within the design using comments and present within security properties they specified, and differs from a designer provided property only in the specific pairing of registers. Additionally, the paired registers match the descriptions for CWE 1272 from the Coverage Guide. Case 154 and other properties compared against the working definition of security properties for Isadora are consider further when evaluating the Isadora methodology in Section 5.5.4.1, including an example of property not meeting the working definition.

5.3 Methodology

Isadora studies designs in four phases (Fig. 5.4): generating traces, identifying flows, mining for flow conditions, and postprocessing.

The first phase instruments the design with IFT logic and executes testbench over the instrumented design in simulation. The result is a trace of that specifies the value and tracking value of every design signal and every time point of execution.

In the second phase, every flow that occurred during the simulation of the design is captured. This set of flows is complete: if a flow occurred between any two signals, it will be included in this set. At the end of this phase, Isadora also produces a set of never-flow pairs: pairs of signals between which no information flow occurs.

The third phase uses an inference engine to infer predicates specifying, for every flow that occurred, the conditions under which the flow occurred.

The final phase removes redundant and irrelevant properties from the set of flow properties. The final set of flow properties plus the set of never-flow properties are produced.
5.3.1 Generating Traces with Information Flow Tracking

In the first phase, the design is instrumented with IFT logic and then executed in simulation with a testbench feeding input values to the design.

Let $\tau_{\text{src}} = (\sigma_0, \sigma_1, \ldots, \sigma_n)$ be the trace of a design instrumented to track how information flows from one signal, $\text{src}$, during execution of a testbench. The state $\sigma_i$ of the design at time $i$ is a list of signal-value pairs describing the current value of every original design and tracking signal in the instrumented design:

$$\sigma_i = [(s_1, v_{1}^i), (s_2, v_{2}^i), \ldots, (s_m, v_{m}^i)]_i.$$

In order to distinguish the source of a tainted sink signal, each input signal must have a separate taint label. However, tracking multiple labels is expensive (Hu et al., 2014). Each added label bit doubles the state space of the design. Isadora initially requires $10$s of gigabytes of trace data. Therefore, Isadora takes a compositional approach. For each source signal, IFT instrumentation is configured to track the flow of information from only a single input signal of the design, the $\text{src}$ signal. This process is applied to each signal in a design. The end result is a set of traces for
design D and testbench T: \( \mathcal{T}_{DT} = \{ \tau_{\text{src}}, \tau_{\text{src}'}, \tau_{\text{src}''}, \ldots \} \). Each trace in this set describes how information can flow from a single input signal to the rest of the signals in the design. Taken together, this set of traces describes how information flows through the design during execution of the testbench T.

### 5.3.2 Identifying All Flows

In the second phase, the set of traces are analyzed to find:

1. every pair of signals between which a flow occurs, and

2. the times within the trace at which each flow occurs.

Each trace \( \tau_{\text{src}} \) is searched to find every state in which a tracking signal goes from being set to 0 to being set to 1. In other words, every tracking-signal-value pair \((s^t, v^t)\) that is of the form \((s^t, 0)\) in state \(\sigma_{i-1}\) and \((s^t, 1)\) in state \(\sigma_i\) is found and the time \(i\) is noted. This is stored as the tuple \((\text{src, s, } \{i_0, i_1, \ldots\})\), which indicates that information from \(\text{src}\) reached signal \(s\) at all times \(i \in \{i_0, i_0, \ldots\}\). We call this the *time-of-flow tuple*. The tracking value of signals may be reset to zero by design events such as resets, so the tracking value may be found to change from zero to nonzero at multiple time points within a single trace.

Once all traces have been analyzed, the collected time-of-flow tuples \((\text{src, s, } \{i_0, i_1, \ldots\})\) are organized by time. For any given set of times \(\{i_0, i_1, \ldots\}\) there may be multiple source-sink flows that occur in the design. Because the same testbench is used to generate every trace \(\tau_{\text{src}}\), the timing of flows from one source \(\text{src}\) can be compared to the timing of flows from a second source \(\text{src}'\); the value \(i\) will refer to the same point in each testbench. At the end of this phase, the tool produces two outputs. The first is a set of the flows through the design and the time at which they occur:

\[
S^{\text{flows}} = \left[ \langle \{i_0, i_1, \ldots\} : \langle (\text{src}_1, s_1), (\text{src}_2, s_2), \ldots \rangle \rangle ; \langle \{i'_0, i'_1, \ldots\} : \langle (\text{src}_1', s_1'), (\text{src}_2', s_2'), \ldots \rangle \rangle ; \ldots \right].
\] (5.5)
The same src may flow to many sinks \( s \in \{s_1, s_2, \ldots \} \) at the same times \( i \in \{i_0, i_1, \ldots \} \), and the same sink \( s \) may receive information from multiple sources \( s \in \{\text{src}_1, \text{src}_2, \ldots \} \) at the same times \( i \in \{i_0, i_1, \ldots \} \).

The second output from this phase is a list of source-sink pairs between which information never flows:

\[
S_{\text{no-flow}} = \{(\text{src}, s), (\text{src}', s'), \ldots \}.
\] (5.6)

The pairs in this set comprise the no-flow properties of the design, and can be trivially rewritten using a no-flow operator, for example \( \text{src} \neq s \). This provides a helpful point of comparison between Isadora’s property generation and automated tools used for property verification. When specified on a single source-sink pair, these no-flows are expressible in the Sentinel language used to write information flow assertion for Radix-S, which Isadora uses to generate traces, and which may also be used to verifying any of of these no-flows. However, Isadora captures all no-flow properties in the design using only one security model per source, whereas checking all pairwise flows individual would have an exponential higher time cost of number of sources times number of sinks (which is one less than the number of sources). Further, Isadora captures the flow conditions.

**5.3.3 Mining for Flow Conditions**

In the third phase, Isadora finds the conditions under which a particular flow will occur. For example, if every time src flows to s, the register r has the value \( x \), Isadora can infer that \( (\text{src} \implies s) \rightarrow r = x \) may be property of the design.

Isadora uses a miner, which itself contains an inference engine, when reading in traces of execution to infer design behavior using pre-defined patterns. In order to isolate the conditions for a particular source-sink flow, Isadora uses \( S_{\text{flows}} \) to find all the trace times \( i \) at which information flows from src to s during execution of the testbench. The trace \( \tau_{\text{orig}} \) containing the state of the original design is then sliced to produce a set of two-clock-cycle trace slices, one for each time
\( i \). Consider time-of-flow tuple \((\text{src}, s, [i, j, k, \ldots])\), which as a notational convenience here uses distinct letters to denote time points rather than subscripts for clarity in the following expression. Given this tuple, Isadora will produce the trace slices \( \langle \sigma_{i-1}, \sigma_i \rangle, \langle \sigma_{j-1}, \sigma_j \rangle, \langle \sigma_{k-1}, \sigma_k \rangle \). These trace slices include only the signals of the original design, all tracking logic and shadow signals are pruned.

The trace slices for a particular source-sink pair are passed into the miner which infers the predicates capturing flow conditions for Isadora properties. These predicates match one of five patterns:

\[
\begin{align*}
  r & \in \{x, y, z\}, \\
  Ar_1 + Br_2 + C &= 0, \\
  r_1 &= r_2, \\
  r_1 &\neq r_2, \\
  r &= \text{prev}(r).
\end{align*}
\]

The first line indicates that signal \( r \) in the original design can take on one of three values: \( x, y, \) or \( z \). The second line indicates equality to a linear combination of terms. The third line indicates that two signals in the original design \( r_1 \) and \( r_2 \) must be equal. The fourth line indicates that two registers are never equal. And, the fifth line indicates that a register \( r \) does not change value during the two clock-cycles of any slice.

**5.3.4 Postprocessing**

As a final step, Isadora eliminates redundant and uninteresting information flow properties. When initialising evaluating Isadora, we found that predicates of the form \( r_1 \neq r_2 \) are usually redundant with the equality predicates of the form \( r = \{x, y, z\} \) because the two registers \( r_1 \) and \( r_2 \) were both constants with different constant values. We also found that predicates involv-
ing a linear combination of terms did not produce meaningful properties that could be mapped back to any semantic meaning within the design. In the one case a linear combination appeared interesting, it was actually capturing a property of a trivial testbench used during development. Consequentially, Isadora simply eliminates linear combination properties.

Finally, Isadora performs additional analysis to find invariants hold over the entire trace set by running the miner on the unsliced trace $\tau_{\text{orig}}$. One such trivial example is the invariant $clk = \{0, 1\}$. Isadora eliminates any predicate that is also found to be a trace set invariant.

The final output properties are potentially multi-source to multi-sink flows with a number of predicates, where flows within the same property occur at the same time and under the same conditions. This produces comparatively few properties, which in practice were approximately as many as the number of unique source signals, and avoids redundant information. Along with the no-flow properties output directly from the second mining phase in Section 5.3.2, these conditional flows comprise the information flow properties produced by Isadora.

This provides the second helpful point of comparison between Isadora’s property generation and automated tools used for property verification. Using these properties from Isadora, by selecting a single source to single case within some property, assertions may be written of the form $(\text{src} \Rightarrow s) \Rightarrow \text{Inv}$, where ‘$\Rightarrow$’ denotes information flow and ‘$\Rightarrow$’ denotes logical implication. This represents a common template used in verification. This process is similar to that described in Section 5.2.6.

5.4 Implementation

Isadora uses the Radix-S simulation-based security verification technology to generate IFT logic for a hardware design, the Questa Advanced Simulator to simulate the instrumented design and generate traces, and the Daikon Ernst et al. (2007) invariant miner to find flow conditions. A Python script manages the complete workflow and implements flow analysis and post-processing.
5.4.1 Generating Traces

Traces are generated for all signals within a design. An automated utility, implemented in Python, identifies every signal within a design and configures Tortuga Logic’s Radix-S to build the separate IFT logic for each of these registers. Isadora runs Tortuga in exploration mode, which omits cone of influence analysis, and track flows to all design state using the $all_outputs variable. The resulting instrumented designs are simulated in QuestaSim over a testbench (see Evaluation, Sec. 5.5) to produce a trace of execution.

5.4.2 Identifying Flows

The second phase is implemented as a Python tool that reads in the traces generated by QuestaSim and produces the set of no-flow properties and the set of all source-sink pairs along with their timing information. This phase combines the bit-level taint tracking by Radix-S into signal-level tracking. Each $n$-bit signal in the original design is then tracked by a 1-bit shadow signal, which will be set to 1 at the first point in the trace that any of the component $n$ shadow bits where set.

5.4.3 Mining Flow Conditions

The third phase is built on top of the Daikon Dynamic Invariant Detector Ernst et al. (2007), which was developed for use with software programs. Daikon looks for invariants over state variables for each point in a program. For Isadora I wrote a custom Daikon front-end in Python (411 LoC, including comments) that converts the trace data to be Daikon readable, treating the state of the design at each clock cycle as a point in a program. The front-end also removes any unused or redundant signals and outputs relevant trace slices over two clock cycles as described in Sec. 5.3.3.
5.4.4 Postprocessing

The postprocessor is implemented as a simple Python script that interacts with Daikon outputs through the file system. The postprocessor does make one additional Daikon run, over the entire trace (rather than slices) but only considering the original design set, to find the set of invariants that hold globally. Then, the postprocessor filters Daikon output from a flow case based on the predicate types discussed in Section 5.3.4 as well as eliminating any predicates that hold globally. The postprocessor also takes the transitive closure across equalities to reduce the number of pairwise properties and redundant mentions of specific registers in the output.

5.5 Evaluation

I evaluate the proposed methodology by assessing Isadora’s ability to find information flow security properties, especially those related to Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs), to answer the following research questions:

1. Can Isadora independently mine security properties manually developed by hardware designers?

2. Can Isadora automatically generate properties describing CWEs over a design?

3. Does Isadora scale well for larger designs, such as CPUs or SoCs?

In comparison to other tools, my collaborators and I are aware of no other tools capable of automatically generating conditions for information flows, and these are the properties considered in Section 5.5.4. Ardehshiricham et al. (2017b) shows register transfer level information flow tracking may be used to verify known conditions on information flows. Likewise, Radix-S and JasperGold are commercial tools that may verify conditions for information flows, but require the properties to be specified for verification. Hyperminer (Rawat et al., 2020) is a specification miner capable of producing information flow properties, specifically noninterference, and is discussed in Section 5.5.3.1.
5.5.1 Designs

I assessed Isadora on two designs, AKER (Restuccia et al., 2021), an Access Control Module (ACM), and PicoRV32, a RISC-V CPU. AKER wraps any AXI controller to implement access control by checking the validity of read and write requests and rejecting those that violate a configured access control policy. AKER was verified as secure by the designers. PicoRV32 is a CPU core that implements the RISC-V RV32IMC Instruction Set, an open standard instruction set architecture based on established reduced instruction set computer principles.

I study AKER to evaluate how Isadora’s properties compare to a manually developed security specification. Isadora was tested on AKER in two configurations: first as a stand-alone ACM with input signals dictated by the testbench, and a second system with two ACM-wrapped traffic generators and three unwrapped and unprivileged modules meant to test the AKER instances in a simulated SoC environment. I refer to these as “Single ACM” and “Multi ACM” cases, shown in Figures 5.5 and 5.6 respectively. For both set-ups I compare Isadora’s mined properties to those manually developed by hardware designers. I use the Multi ACM case to evaluate how well Isadora scales on an SoC design. I use the PicoRV32 to evaluate how well Isadora automatically generates properties describing CWEs and to evaluate how well Isadora scales on a CPU design.

5.5.2 Time Cost

Mining was done on a system with an Intel Core i5-6600k (3.5GHz) processor with 8 GB of RAM. Trace generation was done on a Intel Xeon CPU E5-2640 v3 @ 2.60GHz server. Trace generation dominated time costs, and scaled slightly worse than linear with number of unique signals in a design. Trace generation was suitable for parallelization though parallelization was not considered in the evaluation.

The design sizes are given in Table 5.1. For the Single ACM, trace generation took 9h33m. For the Multi ACM, trace generation exceeded 24 hours so I consider a reduced trace, which tracks sources for one of ACMs, though all signals are studied considered as sinks or in conditions. The reduced trace was generated in 6h48m. For PicoRV32, trace generation took 8h35m.
Figure 5.5: Block diagram of the Single ACM, with the signal groups numbered
Figure 5.6: Block diagram of the Multi ACM

Table 5.1: Various size measures of studied designs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Design</th>
<th>Unique Signals</th>
<th>Unique Sources</th>
<th>LoC</th>
<th>Trace Cycles</th>
<th>Trace GBs</th>
<th>Daikon Traces</th>
<th>Isadora Properties</th>
<th>Miner Time In Minutes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single ACM</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>598</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>29:51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi ACM</td>
<td>984</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>4447</td>
<td>848</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>8:31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PicoRV32</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>3140</td>
<td>1099</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>955</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>15:09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.5.2.1 Theoretical Gains to Parallelization

When parallelizing all trace generation and all case mining, Isadora could theoretically evaluate the Single ACM case fully in less than five minutes. Parallelizing the first phase requires a Radix-S and QuestaSim instance for each source register, and each trace is generated between 120 and 180 seconds. Further, the trace generation time is dominated by write–to–disk, and performance engineering techniques could likely reduce it significantly, such as by changing trace encoding or piping directly to later phases. Parallelizing the second phase requires a Python script for each source register, and takes between 1 and 2 seconds per trace. Parallelizing the third phase requires a Daikon instance for each flow case, usually roughly the same number as unique sources, and takes between 10 and 30 seconds per flow case. The final phase, postprocessing, is also suitable for parallelization, but runs in under 4 seconds on the whole design other than single Daikon instance to generate global properties which took approximately 20 seconds including processing. Maximally parallelized, this gives a design–to–specification time of under four minutes for the single ACM and for similarly sized designs, including PicoRV32.

5.5.3 Designer Specified Security Properties

For the Single ACM I compared Isadora’s output against a designer–provided, assertion–based, information–flow security specification. The specification was written in the Radix-S Sentinel language by applying CWEs to the ACM using to the Radix Coverage for Hardware Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) Guide, which provides architecturally neutral security templates for hardware CWEs. This specification, the covered CWEs, and the results of Isadora on the Single ACM are shown in Table 5.2. For each assertion Isadora mined either a property containing the assertion or found both a violation and the violating conditions for each assertion. For the provided assertions, I grouped them by source, sink, and predicate if applicable using the signal groups in the block diagram, which were also provided by the designers. I reported the observed violations to the designers who determined that the design remained secure but a condi-
Table 5.2: Isadora performance versus manual specification, on the Single ACM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source Group</th>
<th>Sink Group</th>
<th>Predicate Group</th>
<th># of Assert’s Provided</th>
<th>Result</th>
<th>Isadora Properties</th>
<th>CWEs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M PORT</td>
<td>M INT</td>
<td>GLOB</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>2, 40, 1258, 1266, 1270, 1271, 1272, 1280</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M INT</td>
<td>M PORT</td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>43, 53, 1271, 1272, 1280</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M PORT</td>
<td>M INT</td>
<td>C PORT</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>54, 204, 1258, 1270, 1272, 1280</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M INT</td>
<td>M PORT</td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>1272, 1280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S PORT</td>
<td>CNFG</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>2, 6</td>
<td>1269, 1272, 1280</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Isadora also found the conditions for legality.

Only 9 Isadora properties, out of 303 total Isadora properties generated, were required to cover the designer–provided properties, including conditions specifying violations. The Isadora output properties may contain many source or sink signals that flow concurrently and their corresponding conditions. The template–based assertions considered two or three registers. For example, on the ACM nine distinct read channel registers always flow to a corresponding read channel output wire at the same time, so Isadora outputs a single property for this design state. This state included the reset signal and a configuration signal both set to non-zero values, which were captured as flow conditions, demonstrating correct design implementation. This single Isadora property captured 18 low level assertions related to multiple CWEs.

5.5.3.1 Performance vs. Hyperminer

Hyperminer has demonstrated template enumeration of flow properties with no predicate over SoC designs and therefore should be expected to find any property with no specified predicate, including the interference between S PORTs and CNFGs in the last line of Table 5.2, which should be observable in Hyperminer as the absence of a noninterference property over these registers.

While it may be the case that trace fuzzing and information flow tracking do not produce the same results and Hyperminer erroneously produces a noninterference property for these registers,
or that specific traces may be needed for some properties, that is unlikely in this case. These properties are similar to those reported by Rawat et al. (2020), which describes discovery of an expected decoder noninterference properties in an SoC. Conversely, there could exist adversely affecting information flow tracking in cases where Hyperminer does succeed, and information flow tracking, especially for RTL, remains active research area (Ardeshiricham et al., 2017b).

While representing only 5% of the properties studied in this section, these properties contain all observed violations, so over this set of properties Hyperminer would capture all the specification violates captured by Isadora.

By way of contrast, Isadora does additionally find negative properties specifying the conditions under which flows do occur, and has specificity to discover the remaining satisfied assertions.

These comparisons to Hyperminer similarly apply to the case of using Isadora to study the Multi ACM.

### 5.5.3.2 Properties of SoCs

In the Multi ACM case, I studied CWE 411: Unintended Proxy or Intermediary (‘Confused Deputy’). The system contained two controllers (C), with two access control modules (ACM), a trusted entity that configured each ACM (T), and three peripherals (P). The ACMs each implemented an access control (AC) policy shown in Figure 5.6 and given as:

\[
\begin{align*}
AC_1 \text{ of ACM}_1 : & \quad R = \{P_1, P_2\}, \quad W = \{P_1\} \\
AC_2 \text{ of ACM}_2 : & \quad R = \{P_3\}, \quad W = \{P_2, P_3\}
\end{align*}
\]

Isadora discovered legal flows from the ACM\textsubscript{2} write data to P\textsubscript{3} read and write data, and P\textsubscript{2} read data. Isadora also finds an illegal flow to P\textsubscript{1} write data. The the ACM\textsubscript{2} to P\textsubscript{1} illegal flow has a flow condition specifying a prior flow from the relevant signals within ACM\textsubscript{2} to ACM\textsubscript{1}. While
not constituting a precise path constraint, this captures an access control violation and suggests the confused deputy scenario because the flow profile from $ACM_2$ is consistent with this path.

These observed interference patterns are again consistent with the capabilities of Hyperminer, which would likely find similar results.

5.5.4 Automatic Property Generation

For the two designs with full trace sets, the Single ACM and PicoRV32, Isadora generates a specification describing all information flows and their conditions with hundreds of properties. To assess whether these properties are security properties, for each design I randomly selected 10 of the 303 or 153 total properties (using Python random.randint) and assessed the security relevance using CWEs.

I use CWEs as a metric to evaluate the security relevance of Isadora output properties. To do so, for some design, I first determine which CVEs apply to a design. For both the ACM and PicoRV32, I used the Radix Coverage for Hardware Common Weakness Enumeration(CWE) Guide to provide a list of CVEs that specifically apply to hardware. I considered each documented CVE for both designs. CVEs, while design agnostic, may refer to design features not necessarily present in the Single ACM or PicoRV32 or may not refer to information flows. High level descriptions in multiple CVEs may corresponding to the same low level behavior for a design and I consider these CVEs together.

Information flow hardware CVEs describe source signals, sink signals, and possibly condition signals. CVEs provide high level descriptions, but Isadora targets an RTL definition. To apply these high level descriptions to RTL, I group signals for a design by inspecting verilog files and grouping signals, either using designer notes or manual code inspection. With the groups established, I label every property by which group–to–group flows they contain. I also determine which source-sink flows could be described in CVEs, which often correspond or even match a signal group. I use these groups to find CWE relevant low level signals as sources, sinks, and
conditions in an Isadora property. I also use these groups to characterize the relative frequency of conditional flows between different groups, which I present as heatmaps.

5.5.4.1 ACM Conditional Information Flow

Over the ACM I assess fourteen CWEs which I map to five plain language descriptions of the design features, as shown in Table 5.3.

For the ACM signal groups, all registers were helpfully placed into groups by the designer and labelled within the design. The design contained seven distinct labelled groups:

- ‘GLOB’ - Global ports
- ‘S PORT’ - AXI secondary (S) interface ports of the ACM
- ‘C PORT’ - Connections to non-AXI ports of the controller
- ‘M PORT’ - AXI main (M) interface ports of the ACM
- ‘CNFG’ - Configuration signals
- ‘M INT’ - AXI M interface ports of the controller
- ‘CTRL’ - Control logic signals

GLOB signals are clock, reset, and interrupt lines. S PORT represents the signals that the trusted entity T uses to configure the ACW. C PORT represents the signals which are used to
configure the controller $C$ to generate traffic for testing. $M$ PORT carries traffic between the peripheral $P$ and the ACW’s control mechanism. CNFG represents the design elements which manage and store the configuration of the ACW. $M$ INT carries the traffic between the ACW’s control mechanism and the controller. If it is legal according to the ACW’s configuration, the control mechanism will send $M$ INT traffic to $M$ PORT and vice versa. CTRL represents the design elements of the aforementioned control mechanism.

First consider the heatmap view of the Single ACM in Figure 5.7. In this view, all of the designer-provided assertions fall into just 3 of the 49 categories which are outlined in red. Further, all of the violations were found with $S$ PORT to CNFG flows, while all satisfied assertions were flows between $M$ INT and $M$ PORT. Another interesting result visible in the heatmap is the infrequent flows into $S$ PORT, which is used by the trusted entity to program the ACM. Most of the design features should not be able to reprogram the access control policy, so finding no flows along these cases provides a visual representation of secure design implementation with respect to these features.

For the ACM, all ten sampled properties encode CWE defined behavior to prevent common weaknesses, as shown in Table 5.4. In this table, the columns giving a CWE number with a ‘+’ are referring to all the CWEs given in a row of Table 5.3. 8 of 10 properties provide separation between read and write channels showing how many flows within the design occur within these channels, which constitute the main functionality of the ACM module. CWEs 1267-1269-1282 are not found within the conditional flow properties produced by Isadora as these are never flow properties, so they are not present within the samples drawn from numbered conditional flow properties, but I was able to verify they are implemented as never flows in the separate Isadora output capture these types of flows.

### 5.5.4.2 PicoRV32 Conditional Information Flow

Over PicoRV32 I assess eighteen CWEs which I map to seven plain language descriptions of the design features, as shown in Table 5.5.
Figure 5.7: Group-to-group conditional flow heatmap for the Single ACM.

Table 5.4: Sampled Isadora properties on Single ACM
Table 5.5: The 18 CWEs considered for PicoRV32

PicoRV32 had no designer specified signal groups so I used descriptive comments regarding code sections, register names, and code inspection to group all signals. I use lower case names to denote these groups were not defined by the designer.

- ‘out’ - Output registers
- ‘int’ - Internal registers
- ‘mem’ - Memory interface
- ‘ins’ - Instruction registers
- ‘dec’ - Decoder
- ‘dbg’ - Debug signals and state
- ‘msm’ - Main state machine

The memory interface and the main state machine were indicated by the designer. The instruction registers, the decoder, and debug all appeared under one disproportionately large section described as the instruction decoder. Debug was grouped by name after manual analysis found registers in this region prefixed with ‘dbg_, ‘q_’, or ‘cached_’ to interact with and only with one another. Instruction registers prefixed ‘instr_’ all operate similarly to each other and differently than the remaining decoder signals, which were placed in the main decoder group. Internal signals were the remaining unlabelled signals that appeared early within the design, such as program
Figure 5.8: Group-to-group conditional flow heatmap for PicoRV32.

and cycle counters and interrupt signals, and the output registers were all signals declared as output registers.

First consider the heatmap view of PicoRV32 in Figure 5.8. An interesting result visible in the heatmap is the flow isolation from debug signals to the rest of the design. Many exploits, both known and anticipated target debug information leakage, and this entire class of weakness is shown to be absent within the studied design at a glance.

For PicoRV32 I find eight of ten sampled properties encode CWE defined behavior to prevent common weaknesses. I present these results in Table 5.6. In this table, the columns giving a CWE number with a ‘+’ are referring to all the CWEs given in a row of Table 5.5. The remaining two Isadora properties were single source or single sink properties representing a simple logical combination inside the decoder, and captured only functional correctness. CWEs 276-1221-1271
are not found within the conditional flow properties produced by Isadora as only 3 of the 153 properties defined flows prior to reset and none were sampled.

### 5.6 Limitations

In this section, I will discuss the threats to validity for properties produced using Isadora, including false positives and false negatives.

False positives may be introduced by insufficient trace coverage, by limitations of information flow tracking, or by incorrectly classifying functional properties as security properties. Sampling output properties found a 10% false positivity rate with respect to misclassification. This rate is discussed in greater detail in Section 5.6.2.

With regard to false negatives, they fall into two cases: known and unknown. There are no known false negatives from evaluation. Isadora was able to capture all known register transfer level security properties. The sampled properties partially addressed all Common Weakness Enumerations manually determined to be relevant to studied designs, but no CWE was completely covered within the sampled properties, so false negatives with respect to CWEs could still exist if some CWE relevant flow is not specified by the overall property set. Unknown false negatives could arise from limitations in trace coverage or in logical specificity, which I discuss in the following sections.
5.6.1 Trace Reliance

As with any specification mining technique, Isadora relies on traces. The second stage of Isadora, which extracts cases where information flow occurs, relies on generating instrumented traces with sufficient case coverage to drive information flow through all channels present in the design. Additionally, the third stage of Isadora, which mines over the original design state to discover flow conditions, also relies on traces. In the case of traces over buggy hardware, predicates detected in this stage may form a specification describing buggy behavior. Traces may not cover all cases that can be reached by a design or even occur during normal design operation.

Traces may not precisely describe some design features. For example, when considering flows between internal and peripheral signals as in the Case 154 example from Section 5.2.6, Isadora found a flow condition that ARLEN_wire and AWLEN_wire are both set to be exactly 8 for any flow to occur. These registers set transaction burst size for reads and writes. For Case 154, which only described flows in write channels, the ARLEN_wire value should be irrelevant, and this clause within the broader property constitutes a likely false positive.

The AWLEN_wire is a different case. In a property specifying flows during write channel transactions, this register would necessarily be non-zero, and for wrapping bursts must be a power of two (wrapping is implemented by AKER), but manual inspection of the code provides no indication the value must be precisely 8. Some efforts were made to manipulate this and other values for which similar reasoning applied, but ultimately it was difficult to tightly define possible values for which the design could operate but were distinct from the default test bench values for this and other signals.

My collaborators and I are currently working to address this limitation in collaboration with Sam Meng and Kanad Basu of UT Dallas. They study concolic test benches which may drive testing coverage on the basis of defined properties, which in this case would be those generated by Isadora.
5.6.2 Functional Properties

Under the working definition of security property for Isadora from Section 5.2.5, Isadora does contain functional properties in output, as shown in Table 5.6. Sampling output properties found a 10% false positivity rate with respect to misclassification for the sampled properties from both designs, with 0 of 10 properties found to be false positives over the Single ACM version of AKER, and 2 of 10 properties found to be false positives over the PicoRV32 RISC-V CPU.

All functional properties under the working definition were found in RISC-V which I attribute primarily to differences in design and testbench. AKER was studied using a testbench specifically intended for security research, including validation efforts related to information flow. Further, as an access control module, by nature much of its functionality was relevant to secure access control. For this reason, I believe the observed error rate over RISC-V is likely closer to what would be encountered in common practice, especially as test bench creation is an open research problem.

With RISC-V, a minimal test bench was used that was intended only to run the design in an environment without access to the full RISC-V toolchain (such as the simulation environment for instrumented trace generation), and much of the design was devoted to behavior for which CWEs didn’t not necessarily apply, such as logical updates during instruction decoding. One example of an Isadora property classified as functional, with truncated flow conditions, is presented in Figure 5.9, and captures a logical update to an internal decoder signal.

```c
case 154: 128
    _src_ in {instr_lw}
    =>
    _snk_ in {is_slti_blt_slt, is_sltiu_bltu_sltu}
    unless
    0 == _r_ in {alu_eq, alu_shl, alu_shr, alu_wait, alu_wait_2, ... }
    0 != _r_ in {alu_add_sub, alu_lts, alu_ltu, alu_out_q, ... }
```

Figure 5.9: An example of an Isadora property, Case 144, over RISC-V.
5.6.3 Measuring Interference

Isadora assumes the correctness of the information flow tracking used in trace generation. This is not necessarily reliant on Tortuga Logic, and Isadora was able to use information flow tracking technologies developed by Armaiti Ardestiricham then of UC San Diego and her collaborators in the Kastner Research Group to similar results in early testing, including over an AES module.

As an alternative, Isadora could perhaps be configured to interface with Hyperminer or Jasper-Gold to detect information flows, but Isadora uses timing of specific information flows. Hyperminer finds whether an information flow occurs within a trace set rather than at some trace point, and JasperGold as a formal tool finds flows within a design rather than at some trace point. Extending either technique to study trace points would likely require considerable effort and innovation.

Nevertheless, JasperGold offers a formal method for verifying Isadora output properties, and could provide insight into false positives, an immediate further research direction.

5.6.4 Specification Logic

Isadora does not define temporal properties beyond a single delay slot incorporated in the trace slices of length two. However, manual examination of output properties suggests information flow patterns during initialization, which is the first 4 cycles for the ACM and first 80 for RISC-V, are highly dissimilar to latter flows. During initialization, Isadora discovers flows with conditions referencing registers with unknown states (given as ‘x’ in Verilog and encoded as ‘-1’ within Isadora to use integer encoding, a performance optimization). Isadora also finds concurrent flows between pairs of registers for which no concurrent flows occur after reset. By examining commingled trace slices during and after initialization, the generated predicates may be insufficiently precise to capture secure behavior related to this boundary. Isadora could likely produce more descriptive properties using temporal conditions on information flows, such as the temporal property discussed in Section 4.4.5.
This limitation on specifying conditions extends to all logical expressions not produced in the third stage of Isadora, such as implications. Applying the techniques developed in Chapter 3 to produce more descriptive properties would offer one approach to addressing these shortcomings.

5.7 Conclusion

I developed and implemented a methodology for creating information flow specifications of hardware designs in Isadora. By combining information flow tracking and specification mining, Isadora is able to produce information flow properties of a design without prior knowledge of security agreements or specifications. Isadora characterizes the flow relations between all elements of a design and identifies important information flow security properties of SoCs and CPUs according to Common Weakness Enumerations.
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

This work demonstrated specification mining can solve vital challenges for securing hardware designs. To demonstrate security specification mining on CISC architectures, I created Astarte, an ISA level security property miner that partitions the x86 design state space along control signals that govern secure behavior of the processor. security properties comparable to those produced by human experts. The output specification contains properties determined to be security relevant by manual review of design documentation, as well as additional properties capturing correct design behavior with respect to known historical attacks, such as Memory Sinkhole.

To demonstrate security specification mining of temporal properties, I created Undine, a register transfer level security property miner that uses security specific LTL templates for specification detection. The output is automatically generated properties addressing hardware vulnerabilities that can be defined before, after, and across system state transitions on RISC CPU designs.

To demonstrate security specification mining of information flow properties, I created Isadora, an RTL level security property miner that uses information flow tracking on designs to mining information flow specifications. The output gives the information flow relation between all design elements, specifying whether flow may occur between two elements and, if so, under what design conditions. This specification provided coverage over designer–provided sets of security properties and produced output properties that captured CWEs over multiple designs, including an access control module, an SoC design, and a RISC-V CPU.
REFERENCES


